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The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability†
Ronald J. Mann* & Seth R. Belzley**
The internet has transformed the economics of communication, creating a spirited debate as to
the proper role of federal, state, and international governments in regulating conduct that relates to
or involves the internet. Many have argued that internet communications should be entirely selfregulated—either because they cannot or should not be the subject of government regulation. The
advocates of that approach would prefer a no-regulation zone around internet communications, based
for the most part on the unexamined view that internet activity is fundamentally different in a way that
justifies broad regulatory exemption. At the same time, it is undisputed that some kinds of activity that
the internet facilitates violate widely shared norms and legal rules. State legislatures motivated by
those concerns have begun to respond with internet-specific laws directed at particular contexts,
giving little or no credence to the claims that the internet needs special treatment.
This Essay starts from the realist assumption that government regulation of the internet is
inevitable. Thus, instead of focusing on the naïve question of whether the internet should be
regulated, it discusses how to regulate internet-related activity in a way that is consistent with
approaches to analogous offline conduct. The Essay also assumes that the most salient characteristic
of the internet is that it inserts intermediaries into relationships that could be, and previously would
have been, conducted directly in an offline environment. Existing liability schemes generally join
traditional fault-based liability rules to broad internet-specific liability exemptions. Those exemptions
are supported by the premise that in many cases the conduct of the intermediaries is so wholly passive
as to make liability inappropriate. As time has gone on, this has produced a great volume of
litigation, mostly in the context of the piracy of copyrighted works, in which the responsibility of the
intermediary generally turns on fault, as measured by the level of involvement of the intermediary in
the challenged conduct.
We argue that the pervasive role of intermediaries calls not for a broad scheme of exoneration,
premised on passivity, but rather for a more thoughtful development of principles for determining
when and how it makes economic sense to allocate responsibility for wrongful conduct to the least
cost avoider. The rise of the internet has brought about three changes that make it more likely that
intermediaries will be least cost avoiders in the internet context than they previously have been in
offline contexts: an increase in the likelihood that it will be easy to identify specific intermediaries for
large classes of transactions; a reduction in the information costs that make it easier for the
intermediaries to monitor the conduct of end-users; and the anonymity that the internet fosters makes
remedies against end-users generally less effective. Accordingly, in cases in which it is feasible for
intermediaries to control the conduct, we recommend serious attention to the possibility of one of a
series of three different schemes of intermediary liability: traditional liability for damages; takedown
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schemes (in which the intermediary must remove offensive content upon proper notice); and “hot list”
schemes (in which the intermediary must avoid facilitation of transactions with certain parties).
The final Part of the Essay uses that framework to analyze the propriety of intermediary liability
for several kinds of internet-related misconduct. We are agnostic about the propriety of any
particular regulatory scheme, recognizing the technological and contextual contingency of any
specific proposal. Because any such scheme will impose costs on innocent end-users, the selection of
a particular level of regulation should depend on the policymaker’s view of the net social benefits of
eradication of the misconduct, taking into account the costs of compliance with the regulation by the
intermediaries and innocent users. Still, our analysis suggests three points. First, the practicality of
peer-to-peer distribution networks for the activity in question is an important consideration, because
those networks undermine the effectiveness of the regulatory scheme, making regulation less useful.
Second, the highly-concentrated market structure of Internet payment intermediaries makes reliance
on payment intermediaries particularly effective as a regulatory strategy because it is difficult for
illicit actors to relocate to new payment vehicles. Third, with respect to security harms (viruses,
spam, phishing, hacking, and the like), we conclude that the addition of intermediary liability in those
cases is less likely to be beneficial, because market incentives appear to be causing substantial efforts
by intermediaries to solve these problems even without the threat of liability.
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Introduction
To think about the role of law in electronic commerce is to consider the balance between

government regulation and freedom of action in the private sector. Juxtaposing that balance with
the commercialization of the internet in 1994 and its rapid growth since that date presents an
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unusually dynamic policy problem. In her book Ruling the Waves, Debora Spar portrays the
problem aptly, arguing that society’s reactions to important discoveries follow a cyclical
historical pattern.1 Using examples that start with the 15th century reign of Prince Henry the
Navigator of Portugal and continue through the rise of the internet in the 20th century, she
discerns four phases through which the society that exploits those discoveries commonly passes:
innovation, commercialization, creative anarchy, and rules.2 The phase of innovation is the flash
point of discovery—Morse’s invention of the telegraph, for example.3

The phase of

commercialization is the phase in which pioneers (or pirates, depending on your perspective)
move into the new area seeking to exploit its potential: one of Spar’s examples discusses the
actual pirates who exploited the newly discovered Atlantic in the 16th century.4 The phase of
creative anarchy is the phase when the needs of ordinary commerce come into tension with the
theretofore-freewheeling spirit of the new frontier.5 Spar’s best example of that phase is the
1920’s era of radio broadcasting, when competing (and wholly unregulated) radio stations
broadcast on overlapping frequencies that made it difficult for any of them to be heard by
listeners.6 The final phase—rules—follows ineluctably as the commercial enterprises unable to
suppress anarchy on their own call for government intervention as the best vehicle for bringing
order (and profit) to the wild frontier.7
Using that framework, the internet is in the midst of the third phase. There are numerous
examples of early actors whose businesses have provided a major impetus for the growth of the
internet, as we know it. There also are a set of legal rules that have granted those actors broad
freedom of action or exempted them from rules that govern analogous conduct outside
cyberspace. Consider, for example, the immunity granted internet service providers by the
Communications Decency Act8 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,9 the protection from

1. DEBORA L. SPAR, RULING THE WAVES: CYCLES OF DISCOVERY, CHAOS, AND WEALTH FROM THE COMPASS TO THE
INTERNET 11 (2001).
2. Id. (“[L]ife along the technological frontier moves through four distinct phases: innovation, commercialization, creative
anarchy, and rules.”).
3. Id. at 11–12.
4. Id. at 12–15.
5. Id. at 15–18.
6. Id. at 157–58.
7. Id. at 18–22.
8. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2004) (making certain requirements of the CDA inapplicable to ISPs).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2004).
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new taxation granted by the Internet Tax Freedom Act,10 the rise of unregulated peer-to-peer
music sharing, and the lack of regulation of person-to-person payment providers.
Each of those instances, however, has been associated with a growing backlash of pressure,
as parties who perceive that they are disadvantaged by those exemptions seek the establishment
of more rigorous regulatory regimes. That backlash is a primary indication that an industry has
developed to the point where regulation is appropriate. This Essay considers how to implement
regulatory regimes that are better suited for the internet context.11 The basic problem is that
although the internet undeniably has brought increased efficiency to American firms, eased
communication among distant friends, and changed the way we shop, book travel, entertain and
are entertained, it also affords the same ease of communication, increased efficiency, and,
importantly, anonymity for those who prefer to use those advantages to violate the law. Legal
reactions to one pervasive violation—internet-based piracy of copyrighted works—have been
especially vigorous, perhaps because that activity poses a serious threat to an entrenched industry
scared of losing its grasp over its only asset—copyrighted works. Countless numbers of pages in
reporters and law reviews have been devoted to finding ways to prevent internet piracy.
Nevertheless, internet piracy continues and promises to recover from its recent dip12 as software
developers and users adapt and evolve to avoid the current attempts of the legal regime to control
their activities.
Piracy is not our focus, in part because of our view that eradication of piracy would require
an exercise more in the vein of social engineering than of legal reform.13 Rather, our focus is a

10. Pub. L. No. 105-277, tit. 9, 112 Stat. 2681, 2719–26 (1998). This moratorium on taxing internet access has been
extended twice since its original enactment, most recently in November 2004 as the Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act, thus
preventing taxation on internet access through at least October 2007. See U.S. House Clears Tax Ban on Internet Service,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2004, at A7; Bush Signs IDEA, Internet Tax Bills, CONGRESS DAILY, Dec. 3, 2004, at 8. For general
discussion, see Arthur Cockfield, Designing Tax Policy for the Digital Biosphere: How the Internet is Changing Tax Laws, 34
CONN. L. REV. 333, 363-65 (2002).
11. Of course, the first question in each instance is why the businesses that are harmed cannot solve the problems on their
own. For example, why should the government regulate unsolicited commercial e-mail—however annoying it might be—
given the obvious market pressures spurring the major internet service providers to disable those that send it? That question
motivates the skepticism we express about such regulation in subpart IV(B).
12. In fact, some industry experts suggest that the efficacy of RIAA lawsuits is really short-lived. See Carolyn Said,
Studios to Sue Pirates. Film Industry Fights Illegal File Sharing, S.F. CHRON. Nov. 5, 2004, at C1 (“‘When the RIAA has
filed a bunch of lawsuits, we’ve seen a decrease in file sharing for a month to a month and a half; then it comes back up
again,’ said Jim Graham, a spokesman for BayTSP of Los Gatos, which tracks files offered online for sharing.”). But there is
also evidence that lawsuits are effecting long-term successes in some cases. See File-Sharing Website Ceases Operation, L.A.
Times, Dec. 21, 2004, at C3 (reporting that entire websites that provided links to make a popular file-sharing program called
BitTorrent operate were completely shutting down after lawsuits were filed). It remains to be seen, however, if the BitTorrent
system will recover from this setback. Such a recovery seems likely given the popularity of the program and the ease of
locating the simple and necessary websites out of the reach of such lawsuits.
13. Many would argue that this is a case where the underlying business models must shift to meet the limitations of the
regulatory regime. Indeed, there is reason to believe that there is substantial upside to the business models that the internet
facilitates. See Chris Anderson, The Long Tail, WIRED, Oct. 2004, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/
12.10/tail.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2005) (describing how the ability to offer broader product offerings gives electronic
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number of other common uses of the internet for unlawful purposes that have attracted much less
attention.

For example, each day gamblers physically present in jurisdictions that outlaw

gambling bet millions of dollars on card games and sports matches. Although the use of the
internet does not affect the illegality of that gambling, little has been done to curtail the activity.
Further, the internet has made the balance between regulating socially unacceptable forms of
speech and violating the First Amendment even more difficult, leading to the proliferation of
material such as child pornography. Similarly, the anonymity that the internet fosters has made it
much easier to buy and sell counterfeit goods, pharmaceuticals not lawfully available in the
jurisdiction of purchase, and other forms of contraband. Each year Americans spend billions of
dollars and millions of hours combating computer viruses spread over the internet.14
Thus, although the internet has improved our lives in dozens of ways, it has also brought
detrimental behavior that has proved hard to constrain.

Controlling that conduct without

restraining the potential of the internet surely is a worthy goal. This Essay suggests that the
impulse to respond to those problems inevitably depends on internet intermediaries—chiefly
internet service providers (ISPs), payment intermediaries (PIs), and auction intermediaries (most
prominently, eBay). Although a traditional focus on the underlying wrongful conduct would
view the intermediary as a passive conduit exempt from normative responsibility for the activity
of parties that use its system,15 direct regulation of the responsible parties is often impractical.
Where the principal difficulty for analogous offline misconduct is the common lack of financial
responsibility by the offenders, the rise of the internet presents regulators with new challenges by
making it easier for illicit actors to conceal their identity and to locate themselves in jurisdictions
beyond the reach or influence of law enforcement officials inside the United States.
Yet internet intermediaries often fill critical roles in the illicit behavior that frustrates
regulators. Indeed, internet intermediaries often profit directly from transactions that would be
effectively banned in the offline environment. Policymakers of course have not been blind to the
possibility of employing internet intermediaries to control misconduct of their customers. As
early as 1995 a task force created by President Clinton suggested imposing strict liability on ISPs

commerce merchants the ability to extract profits from books, music, and movies that could not profit in an offline retail
environment); JOHN ALDERMAN, SONIC BOOM: NAPSTER, MP3, AND THE NEW PIONEERS OF MUSIC (2001).
14. One estimate put the total cost of viruses at $55 billion for 2003. Compressed Data, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 17, 2004, at
Business (“Trend Micro Inc., the world’s third-largest anti-virus software maker, said yesterday computer virus attacks cost
global businesses an estimated $55 billion (U.S.) in damages in 2003, a sum that would rise this year.”).
15. For an emphatic statement of that perspective, see Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 658-59 (7th Cir. 2003) (per
Easterbrook, J.).
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as a means for controlling some of the dangers of the internet.16 More recently, state attorneys
general and the ATF reached an agreement with major credit card companies to prevent the
processing of payments for illegal Internet cigarette sales.17

Similar initiatives have been

proposed in Congress to address the problem of online sales of prescription drugs.18 And,
Pennsylvania passed a statute (since held unconstitutional) that would have required ISPs to block
access to child pornography sites.19 Private parties have pursued intermediaries under principles
of tort law. In recent suits against, for example, Grokster20 and Ebay,21 plaintiffs have directed
their attention to internet intermediaries in trying to curtail conduct that has detrimental effects on
their businesses.
Thus far, however, the law has been unable to respond in a way that effectively regulates the
activity of the intermediaries. On the contrary, as discussed above, to the extent Congress has
acted to address the question, the laws have been designed to insulate the intermediaries from
liability.22 State regulators have been considerably more aggressive, but, as we discuss, much of
the existing formal legislative activity has fallen in the face of litigation,23 and the problems of
coordinating efforts among multiple jurisdictions have imposed difficulties in others.24 We hope
that our focus here on the costs and benefits of regulation can guide regulators in developing
more nuanced and context-specific rules more likely to withstand judicial attack. Recognizing
16. See RONALD H. BROWN & BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 114–24 (1995) (discussing the arguments for and against carving out an
exception to the general rule of vicarious liability in copyright infringement for ISPs and rejecting such an approach),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf.
17. See Deal Aims to Prevent Web Cigarette Sales, N.Y.
http://www.atf.gov/press/fy05press/031705internetcigsalesinitiative.htm.

TIMES,

Mar.

18,

2005,

at

Business;

18. See Gilbert M. Gaul & Mary Pat Flaherty, Google to Limit Some Drug Ads, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 1, 2003,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23588-2003Nov30.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
19. See infra notes 172–187.
20. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.) (refusing to find liability for Grokster
even though it aided end-users in copyright infringement because the service was fundamentally different than Napster), cert.
granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
21. Hendrickson v. Ebay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (finding that eBay was protected under §512(c)(3)
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act for assisting in the sale of infringing material when notice of the infringement was
not specific enough).
22. Joel Reidenberg in particular has emphasized the incongruity of Congress’s preference for broad statutory exemptions
coupled with the facility with which intermediaries could address some of the most salient problems. See Joel Reidenberg,
States and Internet Enforcement, 1 UNIV. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 1 (2004) (noting the early exemptions for internet
intermediaries and the need to look for enforcement mechanisms directed at intermediaries).
23. The most salient example is Center for Democracy & Technology v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 620 (E.D. Pa.
2004) (invalidating a Pennsylvania statute targeting intermediaries in an effort to limit access to adult content). A fair
assessment of that litigation is that excessively aggressive and insensitive enforcement by state regulators led to the demise of
a regulatory initiative that might have survived had it been implemented with a more guarded attitude.
24. Compare, for example, the relative success states have had in regulating cigarette sales (see supra note 17) with the
persistent difficulty that Massachusetts has encountered in enforcing its unusual (though plainly legitimate) weapons law. See
AG Reilly Obtains Court Order Prohibiting Online Sales by Weapons Dealers (Sept. 10, 2004 press release discussing
repeated lawsuits directed at online weapons dealers).
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the differing constituencies and aims of state and federal regulators,25 it is our hope that our
analysis can help to facilitate the cooperation of federal authorities that will be necessary to
provide effective solutions to the problems motivating existing state initiatives. At the same time,
we want to illuminate the just concerns of technologists trying to preserve the generative potential
of the internet, with a view to facilitating intervention that is more sensitive and less blunt.26
Thus, among other things, our analysis evinces a general preference for initiatives that grant safe
harbors to intermediaries in response to specifically defined conduct rather than general
imposition of liability.27
Scholars have followed up on those possibilities in a variety of ways. Doug Lichtman, for
example, has argued in papers with Bill Landes and Eric Posner that traditional principles of tort
law properly can be used to impose a greater level of responsibility on intermediaries.28 Although
we are sympathetic with much of his analysis, our work takes a different tack, because we largely
jettison the traditional tort principles on which he builds.

In our view, the normative

underpinnings of traditional tort law are not as useful a device for establishing appropriate
standards of conduct as the more direct and contextual focus on the costs and benefits of
intermediary liability that we propose. As we illustrate, a focus on traditional tort law notions of
fault necessarily diverts attention to subjective normative questions of blame and responsibility
that more properly should focus on questions of effective regulatory design.
Other scholars have considered the possibility that intermediaries might be the least-cost
avoiders of some forms of internet-related misconduct. Assaf Hamdani, for example, discusses a
number of problems with imposing strict liability on ISPs for cyberwrongs.29 Similarly, Kumar
Katyal’s work on cybercrimes discusses the possibility of imposing liability on ISPs as a
25. For a parallel emphasis on the differing perspectives of state and federal regulators attending to corporate governance,
see Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
26. For general discussion of the risks of unduly intrusive intervention, see Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet—
and How to Save It (unpublished 2005 manuscript) (on file with author). For a few current examples, see Katie Dean, Techies
Blast Induce Act, Wired, July 23, 2004, at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,64315,00.html?tw=wn_tophead_2 (last
visited Mar. 25, 2004) (discussing the proposed Inducing Infringements of Copyright Act, S. 2560, 108th Cong., 2d Sess.
(2004), which would impose liability on manufacturers of devices that “induce” users to engage in illegal filesharing); Michael
Geist, Say No to Big Brother Plan for Internet, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 7, 2005 (decrying Canada’s proposed “lawful access”
initiative, which would require all ISPs to facilitate real-time interception of internet communications).
27. The National Association of Attorneys General, for example, has called for granting states a right of action in federal
courts to obtain nationwide injunctive relief against intermediaries to stop unlicensed online pharmacies. See Kansas Attorney
General Carla Stovall Testifies On Illegal Online Pharmacies, State-Federal Cooperation to Protect Consumer (undated
press release), available at http://www.naag.org/legislation/stovall_online_pharm.php (last visited Mar. 25, 2005). More
recent efforts against intermediaries (see note 18, supra) presage analogous legislative initiatives against the intermediaries.
28. DOUG LICHTMAN & ERIC POSNER, HOLDING INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS ACCOUNTABLE 3 (U. Chi. L. & Econ.,
Olin Working Paper No. 217, July 2004, available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=573502) (arguing for liability that forces
such cooperation); William Landes & Douglas Lichtman, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: An Economic
Perspective, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395 (2003).
29. Assaf Hamdani, Who’s Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2002).
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response.30 Generally, however, that literature has failed to understand the way in which the
tailoring of remedies to particular contexts can alter or remove so many of the most salient and
powerful problems with intermediary liability generally. For example, Hamdani provides a
detailed analysis of the considerations that justify a choice between strict and negligence-based
liability for gatekeepers, but his framework suggests that there should be no gatekeeper liability at
all in cases in which a damages regime is too costly.31As we explain below, there are other
operationally less-intrusive regulatory alternatives (takedown regimes and hot-list schemes) that
in many contexts might vitiate the costs that justifiably concern him.

Similarly, Katyal’s

discussion—perceptive as far as it goes—is focused on the idea that principles of “due care”
should guide regulation of intermediaries.32 He does not recognize that effective regulation of
intermediaries must leave concepts of due care behind.
In sum, the basic thesis of this Essay is that the time has come for the internet to grow up,
for Congress and for the businesses that rely on the internet to accept a mature scheme of
regulation that limits the social costs of illegal internet conduct in the most cost-effective manner.
Part two of the Essay sets the stage by describing the technological structure of the internet, the
actors that serve as intermediaries, and the existing (largely fault-based) liability regimes. Part
three describes our proposal, which rests entirely on the economic principle of identifying the
least-cost avoider.

We present a consciously exceptionalist33 argument, that specific

characteristics of the internet make intermediary liability relatively more attractive than it has
been in traditional offline contexts: the ease of identifying intermediaries; the relative ease of
intermediary monitoring of end-users; and the relative difficulty of direct regulation of the
conduct of end-users. We then discuss the circumstances when intermediary liability will be
practical, and the characteristics that differentiate the desirability of three different regimes of
liability: traditional damages regimes; takedown regimes (in which offensive content must be
removed after proper notice); and “hot list” regimes (in which the intermediary must avoid
facilitation of transactions with certain parties). Finally, Part four of the Essay applies our
30. Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1095–1101 (2001). For a similar discussion of
internet gambling, see Jonathan Gottfried, The Federal Framework for Internet Gambling, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 26, *74–*91
(2004)
31. The closest Hamdani comes to considering alternative regimes is a brief passage suggesting that legislators might
impose specific monitoring standards instead of damages liability. Hamdani, supra note 29, at 934–35.
32. Katyal, supra note 30, at 1095–1101.
33. Although our argument does lead us to suggest special rules for the internet, we hope that our effort in subpart III(A)
to ground our rules in specific features of the internet justifies those differences. As the discussion below should make clear,
we generally are much more sympathetic to the view (advanced most forcefully by Jack Goldsmith in work such as Against
Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998)) that traditional principles of regulatory analysis are adequate to respond to the
special features of the internet. Indeed, a principal motivation for this Essay is the view that the existing internet-based
exceptions from liability go much too far in protecting conduct that would be unlawful in more conventional contexts.
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proposal to four types of content harms discussed above (contraband, gambling, child
pornography, and piracy) and to the general category of security harms. Although previous
writers have discussed at great length the pros and cons of imposing liability on intermediaries
related to piracy, there has been relatively little attention to the role intermediaries can play in
other contexts, and almost no attention to the specific features of intermediaries and their
particular businesses that make regulation in particular contexts more and less effective.
II.

The Internet and Misconduct

A. The End-to-End Structure of the Internet
The internet is essentially a series of computers connected through a complex system of
cables. The internet was originally conceived of and designed by the United States government
for use by the military and university researchers.34 When the internet was confined to use
exclusively by the military, the military itself, military contractors, or university researchers
managed connections between computers. But as the internet was adapted to use by the general
public, private companies emerged that provided the links between private computers connected
to the internet.35
Today, the internet is a network of privately owned networks that communicate using a
common computer language called Transfer Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP).36
When an internet user requests data over the internet, his request is routed first from his computer
to the network to which his computer is connected, then across lines to the network to which the
computer holding the requested content is connected, and finally to the computer that contains the
requested content. These separate networks comprising the internet could be operated using any
number of different transfer languages. The structure of the internet and the common use of
TCP/IP for transfer between networks allow all of these different networks to communicate with
each other. Larry Lessig has described this structure of the internet as utilizing an end-to-end
principle that places the intelligence of the network at the end of unintelligent conduits, thus
allowing the network to easily evolve and adapt to changing and improving technology.37 Lessig

34. See generally JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET 36 (MIT Press 1999) (describing the creation of packet
switching and the interlinking of distant computers during the 1960s and 1970s by the Advanced Research Projects
Administration, a division of the Department of Defense).
35. See id. at 183–218.
36. Lawrence B. Solum and Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 815, 821 (2004).
37. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 34 (2001).
Although Lessig did not originally conceive of the E2E principle, he has locked onto the idea and eloquently suggested the
logical implications of the internet structure for internet regulations.
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suggests that this design has strong implications for—even dictates—the appropriate types of
internet regulations.38 We agree with Lessig that regulations that compromise the end-to-end
structure of the internet must be recognized as imposing a cost by restricting future innovations in
internet applications. But rather than viewing the end-to-end principle as inviolate, we believe
that it is sufficient simply to recognize the costs of intrusive regulations in a larger cost-benefit
analysis.39
B. Internet Actors
While previous scholars have built on Lessig’s insight by breaking the internet down into
various layers that might be regulated in different ways,40 we take the key point to be a
recognition that the bulk of the regulable activity is likely to occur at the ends of transmissions,
rather than in the center. This does not mean, however, that the parties to internet transmissions
interact with a featureless black box that is beyond the reach of law or regulatory initiative.41
Rather, the implication is that a sensible regulatory framework must start with an understanding
of the different kinds of actors that are situated at the endpoints of internet transmissions, acting
to facilitate the actions of end-users sending, requesting, and receiving those transmissions. The
sections that follow provide a crude taxonomy.
1. Primary Malfeasors.—Primary malfeasors offer or receive content or products over the
internet that violates laws related to subjects such as copyright, child pornography, gambling, and
trademarks. The proprietor of a gambling website, for example, offers content over the internet
that allows visitors to violate gambling laws. On the other side of the transaction, visitors to a
gambling website receive content and interact with the content in ways that violate gambling
laws. Likewise, a person who introduces a malicious internet worm onto a network operates at
the content layer by putting content onto the web that threatens all computers with internet access.

38. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley and Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet
in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001) (arguing that the E2E principle suggests that cable broadband internet
service providers should not be allowed to force customers to subscribe to particular content in order to receive internet
service).
39. For a similar intuition, see Zittrain, supra note 26. Canadian regulators have in fact determined that violating the endto-end principle is justified by the need for regulating internet conduct. The “lawful access” initiative would require ISPs and
future communications providers to design their networks so that they can collect data about customers and intercept
transmissions when required to do so by lawmakers. Michael Geist, Do We Want Fee-Based, Surveillance-Ready Web? Say
No to Big Brother Plan for Internet, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 7, 2005, at D01. For general information on the Canadian
initiative, see NEVIS CONSULTING GROUP, SUMMARY OF SUBMISSIONS TO THE LAWFUL ACCESS CONSULTATION (Apr.
2003), available at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/cons/la_al/summary/las_report_042803_e.pdf.
40. E.g., Solum & Chung, supra note 36; Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. Telecomm. & High
Tech. L. 37, 59 (2002).
41. Again, consider the Canadian “Lawful Access” initiative. See supra note 40.
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2. Internet Intermediaries.—The early days of the internet witnessed many broad claims
about how the internet would lead to widespread disintermediation,42 as transacting parties gained
the ability to deal directly with each other. The reality, however, has been precisely the contrary.
At a basic level, the technology of the internet requires the insertion of intermediaries between
interacting parties in two ways. First, for all interactions over the internet, the communication
necessarily involves the internet itself, as well as the parties necessary to facilitate the particular
communication (except for those relatively few entities sufficiently involved in internet
transmissions to be directly connected to each other).

More importantly for our purposes,

commercial interactions on the internet require the use of other intermediaries, chiefly payment
intermediaries and auction intermediaries, because those transactions cannot use cash as payment
and because there must be some method of bringing the parties together, with auction sites
providing a successful vehicle for internet interaction. We cannot hope to describe all of the
intermediaries that facilitate internet commerce in the current environment, much less those that
will arise in the years to come. For present purposes, however, it is useful to focus on three
classes of businesses, which in our view include the most prevalent and interesting types of
intermediaries: ISPs, Payment Intermediaries, and Auction Intermediaries.
a. ISPs.—ISPs are necessary at every stage of an internet transaction.43 To end-users,
the ISP is the entity responsible for making access to the content on the internet possible. An
end-user is not concerned with which company actually provides the physical network that
transmits data across the country or the protocols that ensure that the data gets routed to the right
place. But recognizing the importance to appropriate regulatory design of sensitivity to context, it
is important to distinguish different roles that ISPs play in common internet activities.
For our purposes, it is useful to distinguish three distinct roles that ISPs might play in an
internet transaction: Backbone Providers, Source ISPs, and Destination ISPs. The first group
includes those that operate solely at the level of transmission (Backbone Providers), with no
direct relationship to any of the actors at the endpoints of the transmission. For our purposes,

42. E.g., Andrew L. Shapiro, Digital Middlemen and the Architecture of Electronic Commerce, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 795
(1998).
43. As Jonathan Bick explains:
Even the simplest internet transaction usually involves a user’s computer, an internet service provider’s access
computer, a regional router, a governmental backbone computer, another regional router, another internet service
provider’s computer, and a content provider’s computer. So, even in the simplest transactions, there are many
more intermediaries than users or content providers.
Jonathan D. Bick, Why Should the Internet Be Any Different?, 19 PACE L. REV. 41, 63 (1998).

12

RONALD J. MANN & SETH R. BELZLEY

[DRAFT

backbone providers are of relatively little interest, because of the costs and difficulties involved in
configuring their networks to distinguish between different types of data they are carrying.44
Destination ISPs serve the end-user who requests content over the internet. Those ISPs are
the entities that bill the end-user for Internet service and provides applications such as the ability
to connect to the World Wide Web. Thus, they serve as gateways for end-users to everything on
the internet. As the owners of equipment that operates to link networks to the internet backbone,
and translate application data into a format that can be transmitted along the backbone, these ISPs
are well-placed to block access to data available on the internet or to prevent the transfer of
harmful data (worms, viruses, spam, etc.).
One premise of this Essay is that the inability of the current regime to control many of the
harms of the internet comes from a myopic focus on the Source ISP, the provider that provides
access to the business at which the unlawful content is made available.45 For regulatory purposes,
there are two important distinctions between the Destination ISP and the Source ISP. The first is
a substantive one: the Destination ISP serving ordinary end-users is most unlikely to have any
direct involvement with or specific knowledge regarding the primary malfeasor. The Source ISP,
in contrast, may be involved in a range of ways that are relevant both in assessing how “fair” it is
to “blame” the Source ISP for the misconduct (the predominant question in existing judicial
doctrine) and also in assessing how effectively the Source ISP could serve as a gatekeeper to stop
the misconduct (the predominant question for us). For example, a Source ISP that is providing
not only access, but also a server on which the unlawful material resides, may be much better
placed to monitor and control the activity than one that provides only access.
The second distinction, however, is the one of importance for our project: the Destination
ISP that wishes to serve ordinary end-users cannot readily remove itself from the jurisdiction of
the government in whose territory the users are located. By contrast, the Source ISP that is
willing to facilitate unlawful behavior can remove itself to a jurisdiction that does not prohibit the
behavior in question. Thus, for example, the Source ISP that is willing to facilitate internet

44. This, at least, seems to be the view of earlier writers, who argue that the difficulty of understanding the data that
travels over ISP networks is an artifact of the internet’s basic transmission protocol, under which the data that travels over
those networks is in the forms of dis-integrated packets of any particular file. See Lessig, supra note 37, at 34; Solum &
Chung, supra note 36, at 829. Commenters on this paper, however, suggest that this perspective is overstated. For one thing,
it seems plain that backbone providers readily can discern the IP address to which packets are being routed. More generally,
more than one reader of a draft of this essay has found it easy to imagine technology that would allow backbone providers to
recognize certain types of content passing through its network. As with much of the analysis in this paper, changes in
technology might change the optimal regulatory strategy. It seems to us, however, that regulation at the backbone level is
likely in most cases to involve costs to all traffic that would outweigh the benefits reasonably attributed to the regulation. See
Zittrain, supra note 26.
45. This point is best made by Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653 (2003).
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casinos can make its services available anywhere that local laws allow such activities,46 putting
these entities outside the reach of most law enforcement agencies.47 But the Destination ISP that
provides the connection for customers in Ohio to visit the internet casino in Antigua must be
present in Ohio, if only in the form of a local server, cable, or router.
b. Payment Intermediaries.—Payment intermediaries facilitate the transfer of funds
between parties to internet transactions. Because most internet transactions do not involve faceto-face interactions between the transacting parties, some intermediary ordinarily must be enlisted
to make it practical for a buyer to transfer funds to a seller in a reliable way. For example, when
a person using the internet incurs a debt, either by shopping on the internet or visiting sites that
charge fees for activities conducted at the website, payment intermediaries are involved in the
chain of events required for the transaction to be consummated. Thus, if A visits a gambling
website whose servers are located in Antigua and signs up for an account so that he can
participate in a game of internet poker, A must provide the website some form of security to
ensure that any gambling debts incurred will be paid. Often, a website will simply require a
credit card to be on file. Alternatively, the site may use A’s bank to transfer money in advance or
otherwise to secure some assurance that A’s potential gambling losses will be covered. The
credit card company or the bank in practice is a necessary actor for the conduct in which A wants
to engage.
Our regulatory analysis depends heavily on particular features of existing internet payment
intermediaries. Most importantly, the market is highly concentrated in the hands of the dominant
credit card networks, and new entrants face high—perhaps insuperable—barriers to entry.48
Intermediaries that have such a comprehensive command of the market at some point begin to
resemble the common carriers on whom lawmakers commonly have imposed regulatory
obligations in the public interest. To be sure, early predictions that a new kind of money—
generically called electronic money—would be created to facilitate internet transactions. Still,
46. In such a structure, there is and has been an international race to the bottom to attract business to certain countries by
decreasing the legal obstacles to their establishment. In the context of internet gambling, the winner of this race has arguably
been the small island of Antigua in the British West Indies. See Don Yaeger, Bucking the Odds, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan.
8, 2001, at 26 (“Some 850 Web gambling sites are based [in Antigua] and an estimated 80% of all gaming URLs on the Web
can be traced back to servers on the 108-square-mile island.”); UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT
GAO-03-89,
INTERNET
GAMBLING:
AN
OVERVIEW
OF
THE
ISSUES
52
(2002),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0389.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (listing 35 of 88 internet gambling websites as
registered in either Antigua or Barbuda, but failing to report the percent of internet gambling taking place at these sites).
47. Indeed the United States even brought a case against the country of Antigua and Barbuda before the WTO in an effort
to curtail the proliferation of internet gambling operations on that tiny island nation. The United States lost that suit. See
Naomi Rovnick, Herbies Helps Antigua in WTO Outsourcing Victory, LAWYER, April 5, 2004, at 10.
48. In 2002, roughly ninety percent of internet transactions used credit cards. Ronald J. Mann, Regulating Internet
Payment Intermediaries, 82 TEXAS L. REV. 681, 681 (2004).
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those technologies have not yet gained any significant base of users, and there is little reason to
think that they will gain such a user base in the foreseeable future.49 The most common new
payment mechanism for internet transactions are the P2P systems,50 such as PayPal, which allow
individuals who are not merchants to receive payments, but even that market has rapidly become
highly concentrated.51 For Internet actors with a business model that involves the receipt of
money, that concentrated and barrier-protected model provides a highly visible “choke point” for
regulatory intervention: an internet pharmacy in Canada cannot profitably sell pharmaceuticals to
American citizens if it does not accept payment devices that American citizens are likely to use.52
c. Auction Intermediaries.—Our last major type of intermediary is the auction
intermediary, which provides the service of matching buyers to sellers, through the mediating
device of a website that facilitates sales between remote parties. Although there are other
competitors, eBay is the dominant and typical player in this multibillion-dollar industry, and thus
not surprisingly the target of most complaints about failure to act to prevent the auction of illegal
goods.53
C. Existing (Fault-Based) Liability Schemes
As a general matter, it is likely that the primary malfeasor is the actor that can most
efficiently prevent most forms of internet-related misconduct. When an internet worm is released
onto the internet, for example, the person who can most easily prevent the harm is the person that
wrote the worm and released it onto the internet. For internet gambling to be successful, there
must be both a gambler and a gambling website. If either of these individuals is lacking, the
gambling will not take place. Thus, if either of these actors can be controlled directly, then the
social harm caused by internet gambling can be prevented. This direct approach is the path that
the law traditionally has pursued.
But regulation that seeks to prevent misconduct through controlling primary malfeasors is
not always effective. These laws are ineffective when individuals are judgment proof or when

49. See RONALD J. MANN & JANE K. WINN, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 576–97 (2d ed. 2005)
50. In this context, P2P stands for “person-to-person.” The term is to be distinguished from the more common use of the
same acronym to describe the peer-to-peer filesharing discussed in the context of piracy.
51. See Mann, supra note 48, at 683.
52. Recognizing that situation, the OECD at one point even considered using payment intermediaries for collecting taxes
on internet commerce. That proposal, however, failed in the face of opposition from those intermediaries. See Arthur
Cockfield, Transforming the Internet into a Taxable Forum: A Case Study in E-Commerce Taxation, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1171,
1257 (2001).
53. See MANN & WINN, supra note 49, at 300-15.
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prosecution is not efficient either because of the high volume of transactions or because of the
low value of each transaction.

Thus, to use the obvious and well-known example, direct

regulation of individuals that share copyrighted material on the internet has not, to date, been
effective to significantly decrease that type of conduct.54 The rise of the internet only exacerbates
that problem by making it easier for even solvent malfeasors engaged in high-volume conduct to
avoid responsibility either through anonymity or through relocation in a jurisdiction outside the
influence of concerned policymakers.
When targeting primary malfeasors is ineffective, policymakers must choose between
allowing proscribed conduct harms to continue unchecked55 and identifying alternative regulatory
strategies. Generalizing broadly, existing formal policy responses have proceeded along two
paths, both of which have resulted for the most part in a relatively broad freedom from liability
for intermediaries.56 First, in a variety of contexts, courts have applied traditional fault-based tort
principles to evaluate the conduct of intermediaries. Although there are instances in which
relatively egregious conduct has resulted in liability,57 many if not most of the cases have
absolved intermediaries from responsibility.58 Second, in contexts in which courts have held
open the prospect that intermediaries might have substantial responsibility for the conduct of
primary malfeasors, Congress has stepped in to overrule the cases by granting intermediaries
broad exemptions from liability.59 Because courts have interpreted those statutes quite broadly,

54. But for some innovative approaches to solving the problem, see WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP (2004);
Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 1345 (2004).
55. As we discuss below, one realistic possibility of course is that responsible policymakers have settled on a system that
declares conduct to be unlawful only because the conduct in fact cannot practicably be proscribed. In such a case,
policymakers have no interest in making enforcement more effective. Many would argue that P2P filesharing is (or should be)
just such an area.
56. As we emphasize throughout, regulators in a variety of contexts have reached informal agreements with intermediaries
in which intermediaries voluntarily agree to cooperate. Our impression is that most of those agreements do not reflect the
view of the intermediaries that they could be forced in litigation to provide that cooperation, but rather the view that a failure
to cooperate would result in formal legislative regulation: the settlements proceed not in the shadow of existing law, but in the
shadow of potential law. That seems to us one reason why, for example, PayPal—hoping to avoid onerous state licensing
requirements—seems to have been much more responsive to those efforts than entities like Visa and MasterCard. For
discussion of state regulatory treatment of PayPal, see Mann, supra note 48.
57. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
58. We do not here take a view on the correctness of that doctrine; we simply note it as part of the background that
motivates our project. For trenchant criticism, see Landes & Lichtman, supra note 28.
59. The most obvious example of this action can be found in the history of the Communications Decency Act. Congress
directly responded to the ISP liability found in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1794
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), 1995 WL 323710, by including immunity for ISPs in the CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2004)
(exempting ISPs for liability as the “publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider”), which was pending at the time of the case. Similarly, Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, codified at
17 U.S.C. § 512, settled tension over ISP liability for copyright infringement committed by their subscribers that had been
created by the opposite approaches to the issue by courts. Compare Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556
(M.D. Fla. 1993) (finding liability), with Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(refusing to find liability).
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they have the potential to provide considerable protection for intermediaries, even beyond the
context that motivated their enactment.60

Although the parallels are not complete, other

jurisdictions seem to be taking a similar approach.61 The paths share not only the reflexive and
unreflective fear that recognition of liability for intermediaries might be catastrophic to internet
commerce; they also share a myopic focus on the idea that the inherent passivity of internet
intermediaries makes it normatively inappropriate to impose responsibility on them for conduct of
primary malfeasors.

That idea is flawed both in its generalization about the passivity of

intermediaries and in its failure to consider the possibility that the intermediaries might be the
most effective sources of regulatory enforcement, without regard to their blameworthiness.
The recent litigation involving Perfect 10, Inc. (Perfect 10) is a salient example of the
ineffectiveness of tort principles in imposing liability on internet intermediaries.62 Perfect 10
owns copyrights in a large number of arguably pornographic63 photographs, which it exploits
through a printed periodical and through a website.64 Apparently because of the significant

60. Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the Communications Decency Act insulates
eBay from claims for facilitating the sale of counterfeit goods); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 109192 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that the DMCA shelters payment intermediaries from claims of copyright infringement).
61. With some minor exceptions, other countries have also seen broad liability exemptions for internet intermediaries as
the appropriate response to judicial findings of liability. The United Kingdom Parliament took no action after the Queen’s
Bench in Godfrey v. Demon Internet Ltd, QBD, [2001] QB 201, held an internet service provider liable as the publisher at
common law of defamatory remarks posted by a user to a bulletin board. In the U.S., § 230 of the CDA apparently would
prevent such a finding of liability. Similarly, courts in France have held ISPs liable for copyright infringement committed by
their subscribers. See Cons. P. v. Monsieur G., TGI Paris, Gaz. Pal. 2000, no. 21, at 42–43 (holding an ISP liable for
copyright infringement for hosting what was clearly an infringing website).
In 2000, however, the European Parliament passed Directive 2000/31/EC, available at http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/l_178/l_17820000717en00010016.pdf, which in many ways mimics the DMCA in providing immunity
to ISPs when they are acting merely as conduits for the transfer of copyrighted materials and when copyright infringement is
due to transient storage. Id. Art. 12, 13. Further, the Directive forbids member states from imposing general duties to monitor
on ISPs. Id. Art. 15. This Directive is thus in opposition to the British and French approaches and requires those countries to
respond statutorily in much the same fashion as Congress responded to Stratton Oakmont and Religious Technology Centers.
Of course courts are always free to interpret the Directive or national legislation under the Directive as not applying to the case
at hand. See, e.g., Perathoner v. Pomier, TGI Paris, May 23, 2001 (interpreting away the directive and national legislation in
an ISP liability case).
Canada has passed legislation giving ISPs immunity similar to the DMCA. See Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42,
§2.4(1)(b) (stating “a person whose only act in respect of the communication of a work or other subject-matter to the public
consists of providing the means of telecommunication necessary for another person to so communicate the work or other
subject-matter does not communicate that work or other subject-matter to the public”). The Canadian Supreme Court
interpreted this provision of the Copyright Act to exempt an ISP from liability when it acted merely as a “conduit.” Soc’y of
Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Can. v. Canadian Assoc. of Internet Providers, [2004] S.C.C. 45, 240 D.L.R.
(4th) 193, ¶92. The court in that case also interpreted the statute to require something akin to the takedown provision of the
DMCA. See id. at ¶110.
62. Our account draws not only on the various published opinions in the litigation, but also in pleadings we have obtained
from PACER.
63. We use the term “pornography” loosely to refer to material marketed with claims of a generally prurient appeal. We
make no effort to distinguish here between material that is or is not protected by the First Amendment or between content that
is or is not lawful under applicable state and federal laws. The discussion in Part IV below is limited to child pornography so
as to avoid the difficult line-drawing questions inherent in regulation of adult-related businesses more broadly. See Ashcroft
v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (consideration of those problems by a divided Court).
64. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1117-18 (C.D. Cal. 2001) [hereinafter CyberNet I].
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commercial value of those photographs, they regularly have appeared on a substantial number of
websites without Perfect 10’s consent, in relatively flagrant violation of Perfect 10’s rights under
copyright law.65 The open contempt for intellectual property rights by the primary defendants in
these cases is evidenced by the common practice of taking Perfect 10 photographs of relatively
unknown models and attaching to them a photograph of a widely recognized celebrity (Britney
Spears being the most prominent).66
In an effort to protect its intellectual property, Perfect 10 instituted several separate causes of
action. The most directly responsible defendant probably was Cybernet, a company that operated
a system that verified the age of customers by using credit card accounts.67 Among its various
activities, Cybernet operated a consortium of privately run internet websites that provided
pornographic material.68 To facilitate this network, Cybernet charged customers a monthly fee
and provided those customers with a password that could be used to access over 300,000 (not a
typo!) privately run pornographic websites.69 Perfect 10 claimed that Cybernet was liable for
direct, contributory, and vicarious copyright infringement, direct and contributory trademark
infringement, and unfair competition.70 Although Perfect 10 lost on many of those claims, the
district court concluded that CyberNet’s participation in the copyright infringement on the sites in
its network was sufficiently direct to justify preliminary relief on claims for contributory and
vicarious copyright infringement and aiding and abetting unfair competition.71
Of more interest to our project, however, are Perfect 10’s actions against Visa, MasterCard,
and Google.72 Perfect 10 claimed, for example that Visa and other companies that facilitated the
credit card transactions were liable for contributory copyright infringement because they made it
possible for Cybernet websites to operate profitably.73 Among other things, it was clear that Visa

65. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2002) [hereinafter CyberNet II].
66. CyberNet I, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 1118, 1125.
67. CyberNet II , 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1158. The system generally rests on the not entirely accurate assumption that those
who hold credit card accounts are not minors.
68. Id. at 1158–59.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1165–89.
71. Id. at 1168-69, 1171, 1174, 1184, 1188–89.
72. Perfect 10 also instituted litigation against a number of less prominent intermediaries, including a group of related
entities that included ISPs, payment intermediaries, and search engine providers. For the most part, the analysis in that
litigation turns on details of copyright law that are not interesting for our purposes. For example, the court dismissed some of
Perfect 10’s claims based on Perfect 10’s failure to send notices that complied with the DMCA, dismissed others for failure to
show any defects in the entity’s policy for terminating repeat infringers, and allowed some actions to proceed based on the
failure of the defendant to submit any such policy. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1086-1103 (C.D.
Cal. 2004).
73. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Servs. Ass’n, 2004 WL 1773349, at *1-*2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2004).
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and MasterCard were aware of the dubious nature of Cybernet’s activities because high
chargeback rates on Cybernet transactions had motivated both networks to place Cybernet in a
category for high-risk merchants.74 Although the opinions do not make it clear, it is plain from
the pleadings that one of the consequences of placing CyberNet in that category is that Visa and
MasterCard charged higher fees to CyberNet than they otherwise would have charged.
In what seems to us a perfectly plausible application of existing law, the court had little
difficulty in dismissing the action against Visa and MasterCard.75 The court relied heavily on the
content-neutrality of Visa and MasterCard services:
Defendants provide content-neutral services. Defendants do not promote the
websites that use their services. Nor do Defendants have content-specific regulations with
which merchants must comply before using Defendants services, as Cybernet did.
Defendants do not hold out certain merchants as being providers of a particular quality of
product. Defendants are concerned solely with financial aspects of the websites, not their
content.76
We would analyze these cases quite differently. The approach of the courts exonerates Visa and
condemns Cybernet based on the (apparently accurate) conclusion that Visa’s level of
participation in the misconduct was considerably less than Cybernet’s. In terms of equity, Visa
has clean hands and Cybernet does not. That might make sense in a legal system designed to
force bad actors to provide redress to injured parties. The better question, however—albeit one
not readily susceptible of judicial analysis—is whether either Visa or Cybernet is the party best
situated to stop the copyright violations in question. On that point, Visa probably is much better
situated, because of the real-world likelihood that none of the sites that fosters the infringement
could survive as a profitable commercial enterprise if it could not accept payments from Visa.77
This is not to say that Cybernet should be exempt from traditional copyright liability if its
participation in the conduct is sufficiently direct (which it seems to be). It is to say, however, that
a separate form of liability for Visa and MasterCard should be considered—one that rests not on

74. Id. at *2.
75. The action against Google has not yet been resolved. Google now faces a similar action brought by the French news
agency Agence France Presse. See Lisa Baertlein, Agence France Presse Sues over Google News, REUTERS, Mar. 18, 2005,
available at http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=internetNews&storyID=7949422 (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
76. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Servs. Ass’n, 2004 WL 1773349, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2004).
77. We assume that any rule would apply equally to MasterCard, to Visa, and to the leading payment intermediaries, so
that a ruling in favor of Perfect 10 would prevent the site from accepting payments from either of the dominant providers. To
the extent the court erred, it is in its assumption that a ruling against the payment intermediaries would have no effect on
CyberNet’s business. Id. at *4. We think it most unlikely CyberNet could survive as a profitmaking entity without access to
one of a small number of dominant payment intermediaries.
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the degree of passivity but rather on the structural relation between the payment providers and the
challenged conduct.
III. Liability Without Fault: Internet Intermediaries as Gatekeepers
A. The Basic Premise
The basic premise of this Essay is that the response described above is a wrong turn.
Fundamentally, we argue, it is inadequate to respond to internet-related misconduct with rules for
intermediaries that turn so pervasively on normative and fault-related notions of responsibility
and participation. The touchstone that we suggest—searching for the least-cost avoider—is not a
new one. Nor is it a new idea that in some cases misconduct can be sanctioned most effectively
through the indirect imposition of responsibility on intermediaries. That idea is prominently
associated with a pair of papers on the subject of “gatekeeper” liability written in the early 1980’s
by Reinier Kraakman.78 To understand its importance, it is necessary to understand both the
distinctive nature of the gatekeeper regime and the reasons it is so well-suited to the internet.
1. The Nature of Gatekeeper Liability.—The first point is the simplest one, already
emphasized above: the imposition of liability under the gatekeeper rationale should have nothing
to do with a normative assessment of the level of responsibility, participation, or support of the
intermediary. Rather, it should turn entirely on the balance between the social costs of the
misconduct and the effectiveness with which the intermediary can sanction the misconduct (more
on that calculus below). That is not to say that it is inappropriate to impose liability in cases in
which the intermediary is directly involved in the misconduct. For example, in Napster, it seems
not an unfair assessment of the facts to conclude, as the Ninth Circuit did, that Napster was so
involved in unlawful P2P filesharing79 as to make it appropriate to sanction Napster for that
misconduct. The gatekeeper inquiry, however, would turn on the question whether Napster could
serve as a reliable tool for preventing unlawful filesharing. As we discuss below, the fact that no
actions by Napster could possibly have stopped unlawful filesharing suggests that imposition of
gatekeeper responsibility on Napster would have been ineffective.80

78. Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53
(1986) [hereinafter Kraakman, Gatekeepers]; Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984) [hereinafter Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies].
79. That assumes of course something that is not yet entirely clear: that there is very little personal trading of music that
constitutes fair use under Copyright Act § 107.
80. As that discussion emphasizes, we do not suggest that Napster could not have stopped filesharing on its network. On
the contrary, it seems plain that Napster readily could have eliminated the great majority of unlawful filesharing on its
network. Our point is the more systemic one that even the complete eradication of Napster (and Grokster) will do little to
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To put the point affirmatively, the key question for determining the propriety of
intermediary liability is how plausible it is to think that the intermediary could detect the
misconduct and prevent it.81

Specifically, because the analysis premises the imposition of

responsibility on a determination that the intermediary is the least-cost avoider of the misconduct
in question, a proper determination requires not only that the gatekeepers be able to detect
offenses, but they also be able to detect and prevent them economically. Thus, for example, if the
sole effect of the regulation of a particular intermediary will be to motivate illicit actors to shift
constantly to ever more elusive intermediaries—with no effect on the underlying misconduct—
then the costs of the regulation are likely to be a total loss. This suggests to us that one of the
central factors in assessing the best regulatory strategy must be the market structure of the various
intermediaries: intermediaries with market power that prevents illicit actors from moving to
substitutes are much better targets than those for whom there are ready substitutes.

Thus,

continuing with the example above, focusing attention and regulatory resources on entities like
Napster, Grokster, and their progeny makes sense only if it is plausible to believe that their
eradication would stop piracy.

Conversely, attention to entities like eBay or the dominant

payment intermediaries is particularly effective in contexts where the illicit conduct depends
directly on access to the facilities of those intermediaries.
The point here is not to make a definitive assessment of the potential technological
responses, which would be both beyond our capabilities and short-lived in its accuracy in any
event.82 The point is simply to emphasize that a strategy making use of intermediaries makes
sense only in contexts where the inevitable costs can be balanced against benefits in real
reductions—rather than relocations—of misconduct.83

slow unlawful filesharing, which—in the absence of a significant escalation in the ability of content providers to intervene in
the architecture of the internet—will continue to proceed on ever more elusive networks. For a cautionary note on the risks of
such intervention, see Zittrain, supra note 26.
81. Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 78, at 54; Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 78, at 890–94.
82. For example, it is not at all far-fetched to think that ISPs—or even consumer’s own computers—soon could be put in a
position to monitor the particular applications being used by their customers. Zittrain, supra note 26. If this sounds
implausible, consider the conventional wisdom that manufacturers of photocopiers cannot build their machines to prevent
private copyright infringement. E.g. Landes & Lichtman, supra note 28, at 409 (“[A]lthough firms that produce photocopiers
might not be able to discourage piracy directly, they can easily build into their prices a small fee that could in turn be used to
compensate injured copyright holders.”) But as the relentless march forward of technology continues, this conventional
wisdom is brought into doubt when one learns about new technologies being implemented such as the one the U.S. Treasury is
using to fight currency counterfeiting. The technology gives digital scanners the ability to recognize currency when it is
scanned. The scanners then override the scan and direct users to a website that contains information about the use of currency
images. Ted Bridis, Low-Quality Images of New $50 Bill Offered; Making Digital Copies Is Getting More Difficult,
TELEGRAPH HERALD (Dubuque, IA), Oct. 10, 2004, at B13.
83. See Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control and Jurisdictional Competition
(unpublished 2005 manuscript) (on file with author).
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2. Gatekeeper Liability and the Internet.—The second point is an overtly exceptionalist
argument that gatekeeper liability is systematically more likely to be effective in the modern
internet environment than it has been in traditional offline environments.84 This is true for three
separate reasons. First, as should be clear from the discussion of the structure of the internet in
Part I, it often will be the case that a particular type of misconduct on the internet generally will
proceed through a readily identifiable intermediary or class of intermediaries, and that it will not
at reasonable cost be practicable for those who wish to engage in misconduct to avoid such an
intermediary: the customer who wishes to purchase contraband on the internet is quite likely to
interact with a site that describes or provides the contraband and to use some form of payment
intermediary to pay for the contraband. This is of course a substantial change from offline reality,
in which the seller of contraband need not establish a freely accessible place of business and in
which wholly untraceable cash payments are easy.
Second, advances in information technology make it increasingly cost-effective for
intermediaries to monitor more closely the activities of those that use their networks. As it
becomes cheaper to monitor activity more closely, it ineluctably becomes relatively85 more
desirable to rely on such monitoring as the least expensive way to eradicate undesirable activity.86
Third, the relative anonymity that the internet fosters makes remedies against primary
malfeasors much less effective than they are in a brick and mortar context. Thus, for example, it
is much easier to obtain a relatively anonymous email account (from a provider such as Google)
for use in connection with illicit conduct than it is to obtain a post-office box in the offline world.
This is not to say that anonymity is impossible in the offline world or that it is perfect in the
online world; it is simply to say that it is much easier to engage in relatively anonymous conduct
online than it ever has been offline. But with the introduction of intermediaries in targeting
certain activities, this anonymity decreases significantly.

The networks provided by the

intermediaries, whether communication networks in the case of ISPs, payment systems in the
case of payment intermediaries, or auction systems in the case of auction intermediaries, require
that users of those networks be identifiable to varying extents. ISPs provide service to an

84. Joel Reidenberg notes the possibility that intermediary enforcement might be “more efficient” if illegal activities are
“channeled through gateway points.” Reidenberg, supra note 22. He does not, however, focus as we do here on the
systematic reasons why that might be so.
85. We suggest only that it becomes relatively more desirable. As we emphasize throughout, the costs of monitoring in
many cases might make large-scale monitoring unjustified except in cases of serious misconduct.
86. This point of course can be overstated. Just as technology in the last few years seems to have made monitoring easier,
it is entirely possible that technology in the near future will make it easier for wrongdoers to avoid monitoring. As discussed
below, it is our impression that this has been happening in the filesharing area, where advances in P2P technology have made
it difficult to locate and identify resourceful filesharers and those who assist them. It is not clear, however, whether this
always will be so. See Zittrain, supra note 26.
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identifiable account holder. The electronic payment systems currently in widespread use require
transfers to identifiable accounts. And auction intermediaries obtain personal information in
order to facilitate the smooth operation of auctions and to ensure payment. Thus, when these
types of intermediaries are engaged in the battle against an activity, the information they collect
in order to provide their services automatically and necessarily decreases the anonymity of the
transaction.
B. Variations on the Theme
Traditional discussions of gatekeeper and intermediary liability have proceeded on the
implicit assumption that a standard damage remedy will be used to induce the intermediary to
curtail misconduct by the primary malfeasors that are under the control of the intermediary.
Thus, one of the principal topics in the literature has been the question whether the liability of the
gatekeeper should be strict or based on negligence or fault.87 From our perspective, however, a
more contextual assessment of the multifarious types of internet intermediaries suggests that a
wider array of policy options should be considered. For present purposes, it is enough to describe
three types of remedies: a traditional tort remedy for damages, a takedown regime (the DMCA
being the leading example), and a “hot-list” regime (common in bank regulation).
A traditional tort remedy imposes the greatest risk on the intermediary, because, depending
on the details, it leaves the intermediary exposed to damages if the intermediary fails to take
adequate steps to detect and control misconduct.88 If the risk of liability is not readily predictable
or cabined, that remedy is most likely to have adverse collateral effects (such as
overdeterrence).89 That problem is particularly serious when that remedy applies to misconduct
that is not entirely avoidable by the intermediary. Consider, for example, a regime in which an
ISP is responsible for copyright infringement for all unlawful filesharing in which its customers
engage. If monitoring technology makes it feasible for the ISP to detect some—but not all—of
the conduct in question, then we might expect that a remedy holding the ISP strictly liable for the
misconduct will have a considerable adverse effect on all users—either through restrictions on
service or through an increase in price. Conversely, because it applies only ex post, a damages
remedy would have the undeterring aspect that it would have no effect on the conduct of

87. See, e.g., Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53 (2003).
88. This problem of course could be mitigated if the remedy were a statutory fine in a fixed amount. In that case, the key
question of course would be how to set the fine so as to provide the appropriate incentive.
89. Here, for example, it is common for cyberlaw scholars to worry that the imposition of any liability on intermediaries
for the action of their customers will lead to the prohibition of anonymous postings, which will have adverse effects on
internet polity.
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financially irresponsible intermediaries. The schemes we discuss below—with more objective ex
ante requirements—would be more effective in pinpointing irresponsible intermediaries and
removing their ability to facilitate misconduct.
The second potential remedy is a takedown scheme.

The paradigmatic example, the

provisions of the DMCA codified in Section 512 of the Copyright Act,90 generally obligates
covered intermediaries to remove allegedly illicit conduct promptly upon receipt of an adequate
notice of the misconduct.91 Although this scheme does impose obligations on the intermediaries,
it imposes a relatively small risk of liability, because it generally carries with it an implicit
exemption from monetary relief so long as the intermediary complies with appropriate takedown
notices.92 Thus, this response is less costly, and can be justified as a response to a problem with
lower social costs than the problems that would justify a damages remedy.
At the same time, this response is less effective, because it does not enlist the aid of the
intermediary in identifying and removing illicit material. The dispute between Tiffany and eBay
illustrates the problem.93 Let us suppose, as seems likely to be the case, that eBay is more than
willing to remove from its auction site any postings for materials that Tiffany can identify to eBay
as falsely claiming to be Tiffany trademarked products. Yet, eBay still might sell millions of
dollars of counterfeit Tiffany products each year, solely because of the difficulty Tiffany would
face in identifying each counterfeit product sufficiently rapidly to forestall a successful auction.
Tiffany plausibly might think that eBay could identify those auctions more effectively than
Tiffany and wish that eBay were obligated to do so. A takedown remedy, rather than a damage
remedy, would provide little help to Tiffany in that circumstance.
The final response is a “hot list” scheme. This type of scheme is common in the financial
industry. Generally, in this type of scheme a reliable actor (such as the government) identifies a
list of illicit actors. Thus, most commonly, banks have for years been prevented from wiring
money to any entity on the federal government’s list of entities that support terrorist activity.94

90. 17 U.S.C. §512(c) (2004)
91. Such a system of course could be designed more or less effectively. For example, it might be that the DMCA imposes
excessive costs by giving intermediaries an incentive to remove material upon the receipt of ill-founded notices and by
providing unduly burdensome avenues of review to the party whose information is taken down.
92. There remains the possibility, not yet settled in the courts, that an intermediary could have traditional liability for
direct participation in the initial posting even if the intermediary complied with a takedown notice after the fact. See CoStar
Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004).
93. See generally Psst, Wanna Buy a Cheap Bracelet?, ECONOMIST, July 3, 2004, at 13 (describing the controversy
between Tiffany & Co. and eBay and concluding that liability for eBay is wrong because of the immense difficulty of
monitoring auctions and verifying whether items offered for auction are genuine).
94. In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, President Bush made it illegal, by executive order, to transfer
property to certain persons listed initially by the Executive Order and subsequently designated by the Secretary of State.
Executive Order 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Person Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or
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This scheme is likely to provide the most predictable exposure to intermediaries, because their
obligations are purely ministerial.

Indeed, with advances in information technology that

presumably would allow such lists to be examined automatically,95 violations by the
intermediaries might be quite rare. Of course, this scheme goes even further than the takedown
scheme to shift the burden of monitoring away from the intermediary. Here, the government
must expend sufficient resources to identify the illicit actors even before the illicit transactions
begin.96 Thus, this response will be useful only in situations in which the illicit transactions are
likely to have a readily identifiable and relatively stable location.
We provide of course only a simple list of options. It is easy to imagine responses that
combine features from the various options. Most obviously, the framework above does not
specify what the remedy would be for failure to comply with a take-down or hot-list requirement.
The remedy for such a failure itself could be calibrated to extend only to a loss of immunity (the
result under the existing DMCA regime), or could extend more broadly to secondary liability for
the unlawful activity, or perhaps to some intermediate sanction (such as a fine in an amount less
than the fine that would be imposed for the unlawful illicit activity).
C. A Framework for Analysis
The foregoing subparts doubtless will strike some as evincing undue optimism about the
value of imposing liability on intermediaries, as well as a blithe lack of concern about the costs
that liability will have on the intermediaries and on those that depend on the services that
intermediaries provide. That is not, however, because we are unaware of or unconcerned about
those costs. Rather, it is because it is necessary to describe the structure and premises of the
proposed liability before we can describe how policymakers should use the tool. Nor should the
discussion be taken as directly critical of the efforts of judges working under existing law. It
should be plain that the liability schemes that we envision are not the type of thing readily
adopted through the development of the common law. Our framework is intended to provide

Support Terrorism (Sept. 23, 2001). Today, the Office of Foreign Asset Control, part of the Department of the Treasury,
maintains a list of designated foreign nationals to or from whom banks are forbidden to facilitate transactions. For more on
these regulations, see OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSET CONTROL, FOREIGN ASSET CONTROL REGULATIONS FOR THE FINANCIAL
COMMUNITY (2005), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/regulations/t11facbk.pdf.
95. Lists of designated persons are available for download in a variety of electronic forms to increase the ease with which
financial intermediaries can integrate required blocking into their existing systems. See Office of Foreign Asset Control, SDN
and Blocked Persons Data Formats, at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/data.shtml (last visited Jan. 15,
2005).
96. The text assumes that regulators will not delegate to private entities the ability to designate entities to be placed on hot
lists, and that regulatory decisions on that point will be made under procedures that provide reasonable notice and opportunity
for review. Systems that did not provide those safeguards of course would be more costly and thus less justifiable.
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fodder for legislators and regulators, not for judges.97 Thus, we hope that our analysis can lead to
well-specified statutory schemes or regulatory initiatives.

Among other things, a general

directive to courts to implement intermediary liability easily could shade into judicial doctrines
that would obligate all actors to stop all misconduct whenever they can. As Judge Posner
recently explained, such an unbounded principle would be unduly disruptive.98 Our hope, in
contrast, is that the state regulators that currently are searching for tools to respond to internetrelated conduct that they find offensive, will consult the framework that we articulate so that the
informal responses that they seek—and, increasingly, obtain—will reflect an appropriate
sensitivity to the costs their remedies impose.
Furthermore, we express no views as to the social benefits to be gained from eradicating any
of the various forms of misconduct discussed in the next Part of this Essay.

From our

perspective, that is a judgment call to be made by the relevant policymaker: we express no
opinion here, for example, on the relative social benefits to be obtained from limiting the sale of
counterfeit goods, limiting sharing of copyrighted music, and limiting the dissemination of child
pornography. In each case, those benefits, whatever they might be, must be weighed against the
costs of imposing intermediary liability.

As the discussion above emphasizes, the relevant

benefits are the value of eradicating the misconduct that the particular liability scheme in fact will
eradicate.
At the same time, the costs of any of these regimes are likely to be substantial.99 The
existing literature focuses on two general categories of costs, which seem to us illustrative. It is
well recognized that the imposition of liability on intermediaries will affect the services and
prices they present to their customers.100

If regulation increases costs substantially, some

customers will stop using the gatekeeper’s service, those that derive net benefits from the service
that are less than the newly imposed costs. In some cases, and especially as the cost of liability to
the gatekeepers increases significantly, the problem may spiral out of control, so that the only
customers to remain will be those who are using the gatekeepers’ services in highly rewarding

97. For analysis criticizing the doctrine judges have developed under the existing statutory scheme for piracy, see Landes
& Lichtman, supra note 28 (arguing that broad ISP exemptions are inconsistent with traditional rules of tort liability).
98. Cuyler v. United States, 362 F.3d 949, 955–56 (2004).
99. For a thorough discussion, see Hamdani, supra note 87, at 63–82.
100. See Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 78, at 77, 93–94; Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 78,
at 892 (“[F]irms will . . . pay for the risk of additional liability in the familiar ways. If outside gatekeepers cannot shift their
liability risks, they will charge high risk premiums.”).
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ways.101 In situations where the remaining users are predominantly those committing the targeted
acts, the ultimate effects of the regulation are likely to be counterproductive.
Another problem is that gatekeeper liability might upset the market balance for the services
provided by gatekeepers. Specifically, there always is the risk that imposing additional burdens
on intermediaries can chill the provision of valuable goods and services. That will be especially
problematic in cases in which there is considerable risk of chilling legal conduct that is adjacent
to the targeted conduct. As we discuss below, that might tend to make the use of intermediaries
less plausible in file-sharing contexts (where it is quite difficult to be sure any particular act of
file-sharing is illegal) and much more plausible in the gambling context (where it is plausible in
many cases that substantially all traffic to a particular site involves illegal conduct). Requiring
intermediaries to make those kinds of subjective decisions imposes costs not only on the
intermediaries (that must make those decisions), but also on the underlying actors whose conduct
might be filtered incorrectly. To the extent the regulation affects conduct that has positive social
value102—as it is likely to do in at least some of our contexts—the direct and indirect effects on
that conduct must be counted as costs of any regulatory initiative. Thus, we emphasize that in
any particular case, the costs of any particular regime described in this essay might exceed the
benefits that could accrue from implementing the regime, and in such a case we would not
support a new regime.
But the premise of any regulatory state is that society successfully can impose burdens on
actors that will provide substantial social benefits while not overdeterring those individuals from
providing their services. We see this when the local, state, and federal governments impose tax
burdens on private actors. Taxes are an additional burden on business, but in situations where the
taxes are well-designed, society can benefit both through the provision by the business of taxable
goods and services and also by the use to which the government puts the tax revenues.

***
In sum, we pose a traditional cost-benefit calculation, in which the policymaker should
assess the costs, broadly defined, of the particular scheme of intermediary liability. If those costs
exceed the benefits, then the particular form of intermediary liability might be appropriate. If
they do not, then the new liability is not appropriate.

101. This is the problem of “unraveling” markets, discussed in detail by Hamdani. See Hamdani, supra note supra note
87, at 72–73.
102. Assaf Hamdani emphasizes the point that this problem will be particularly serious because intermediaries will fully
internalize the sanctions they will face for failure to filter with sufficient vigor, but will not internalize the social costs of
excessive filtering. Hamdani, supra note 29.
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IV. Applications to Specific Types of Conduct
The nuance that is necessary to do a responsible job of enlisting intermediaries in the quest
to cabin misconduct on the internet can best be seen through concrete examples.

For our

purposes, two distinct categories of misconduct are useful: wrongful dissemination of content and
breaches of security. The first category broadly includes the use of the internet to provide
material that violates applicable law. The examples on which we focus here are advertising the
sale of contraband or counterfeit goods, internet gambling, child pornography, and sharing
copyrighted files. The second category includes breaches of security—viruses, hacking, spam,
and the like—which threaten the integrity of the computer systems that have become so essential
to our modern economy.
A. Dissemination of Content
The basic problem with regulating content in an internet era is that content can reside on any
computer in the world that can be connected to the internet. Thus, regulations that prohibit the
dissemination of particular content often cannot reach those that make content available in places
where it is unlawful. A policymaker could respond to that situation in any number of ways: by
accepting a status quo in which laws on the books tacitly are flouted by widespread internet
conduct, by formalizing the futility of regulation by abandoning the regulations entirely, or by
adopting a new system of regulation that is more effective than targeting primary malfeasors.
Our analysis in this subpart does not advocate any one of these options for any of the particular
types of misconduct that we address. Rather, our aim is the more modest one: To illustrate the
features of particular situations that might make a specific form of intermediary liability a more
or less useful device for limiting misconduct.
1. Trafficking in Contraband and Counterfeit Products.—The simplest problem is the
problem of contraband and counterfeit products.

To use the prominent example discussed

above,103 Tiffany & Co. has been engaged in a long-running dispute with eBay about the sale on
eBay of counterfeit Tiffany & Co. merchandise. There are, however, other obvious problems that
have drawn attention from regulators: the sale of pharmaceuticals to United States residents that
have not been approved for use by the FDA (principally from Canadian retailers),104 the sale of
cigarettes in violation of local and federal tax laws105 are notable.

103. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 18.
105. See supra note 17.
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In some ways, these situations are much more tractable than the situations discussed in the
sections that follow, because much of the conduct is likely to involve the shipment of products to
addresses located in jurisdictions in which the sale of the product is plainly illegal.106 Thus, for
example, it is easy to see that Massachusetts should be able to proscribe the shipment of firearms
to an address physically located in Massachusetts.107 A rule limited to such shipments would be
both underinclusive (it would not bar shipments to addresses just outside Massachusetts even if
the products ultimately would be distributed in Massachusetts) and perhaps overinclusive (some
shipments to Massachusetts addresses might be intended for use outside the state). Yet, a
practical scheme for prohibiting such shipments would go a long way (particularly in states larger
than Massachusetts) to prohibiting the targeted conduct and impose relatively little cost on
innocent third parties: it is not too much to ask, we think, that persons that want to buy guns that
are illegal in Massachusetts should come up with a mailing address outside the borders of the
state.

Even in cases of nonuniform regulation (like firearms or wine), the analogy of the

Streamlined Sales Tax Project108 suggests that it should be easy enough under current technology
for responsible retailers to refrain from shipping contraband into prohibited jurisdictions.
In some cases, however, direct enforcement against a retailer will be ineffective. For
example, in some cases a jurisdiction might face a large number of small, relatively irresponsible
retailers, so that direct enforcement would be prohibitively expensive in practice. Two more
general examples are cases in which the retailer takes advantage of the relative anonymity
afforded by an auction site like eBay or cases in which the retailer is located outside the United
States, in a jurisdiction that will not cooperate with the applicable state regulators. Even in those
cases, it is important that the business model for the primary malfeasors generally involves a
retail sale of the product in return for monetary compensation.

Among other things, this

generally involves the existence of a website at which the nature and availability of the product is
evident to all (at least in an era of effective search engines). This has several ramifications for the
design of a policy response. Most obviously, it means that intermediaries often would be able to
detect and control the conduct.

We discuss here auction intermediaries and payment

intermediaries, which seem to be the simplest and most common possibilities.

106. The conduct that does not involve physical shipments is harder to deal with both because of the threshold question
whether the illegal conduct in fact occurs in the targeted jurisdiction—how exactly do we decide where online gambling
occurs?—and because of the consequent difficulty in designing practical ways for intermediaries to identify illegal conduct
that is adequately related to the regulating jurisdiction.
107. See supra note 24.
108. See www.streamlinedsalestax.org. For discussion, see Cockfield, supra note 10, at 386-88, 397-98.
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a. Targeting Auction Intermediaries.—Auction intermediaries are particularly relevant
for the problem of counterfeit trademarked goods—the other contraband problems mentioned
above tend to involve offshore suppliers of products that violate local regulatory schemes. eBay,
in contrast, is an entity with a major domestic presence that owns facilities through which a
substantial amount of counterfeit goods are sold. In that context, it seems clear that eBay could
detect and prohibit many of the sales of counterfeit Tiffany & Co. products at its site.109 What we
are really talking about, then, is the question whether the burden should be on Tiffany & Co. to
locate counterfeit products and bring them to eBay’s attention (as it would be under a DMCA
take-down regime) or whether the burden is on eBay in the first instance to locate those products
and remove them.
Viewed from the perspective set forth above, the relevant policy considerations are easy to
discern. On the one hand, it is at least plausible to think that eBay is better-placed to identify
those products in the first instance. Surely eBay is more adept at searching and monitoring its
marketplace than Tiffany & Co.; at the same time, eBay probably is not as effective as Tiffany &
Co. is at the task of distinguishing bona fide Tiffany products from counterfeits.110 The net
benefit of shifting that task to eBay from Tiffany—the combination of cost savings and any
increased detection of misconduct—is the potential benefit of intermediary liability in this
context. The magnitude of that benefit is difficult to quantify, because it depends in part on the
social value of the increased detection of that misconduct. The costs, on the other hand, are the
burdens that shifting that task to eBay would impose on all users. Among other things, that
burden is likely to diminish the functionality of eBay’s site even for innocent users by setting up
additional steps that will slow the availability of their postings.
If the social benefits of removing the contraband or counterfeit products were high enough,
it might be plausible to impose a damages regime—under which eBay and other intermediaries
would be strictly liable for this conduct. Given the difficulties eBay would face in complying
with a mandate to remove all counterfeit products, it might be more plausible, however, to adopt
a takedown regime of some kind—perhaps a regime under which eBay would be obligated to
109. Tiffany & Co. complains of sales of products that are advertised falsely as Tiffany & Co. products and also of
products that appear to bear a counterfeit Tiffany & Co. mark but are not advertised as such. See Psst, Wanna Buy a Cheap
Bracelet?, supra note 93. The first category apparently could be detected by textual searches of advertising copy. The second
category would be more difficult to detect without a search engine that could search visually for a particular mark. The
development of such a search engine—certainly plausible under existing technology—well might shift the appropriate locus of
responsibility.
110. Indeed, it may be that we err in assuming that monitoring is the lowest-cost method of eradicating contraband from
eBay. We can imagine, for example, circumstances in which it might impose a lower net burden on eBay’s business for eBay
to require bonds from its customers to ensure their compliance with applicable restrictions on contraband. Given the small
size and presumptive illiquidity of many eBay merchants, we doubt that would be the optimal response. Our main point,
however, is that eBay plainly is better situated to assess the relative costs of different remedies than Tiffany.
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remove all counterfeit products for the owners of famous marks111 that made a suitable request.112
Similarly, particularly if the costs of compliance were sufficiently great that they might alter the
pricing of eBay’s services to all customers, it might make sense to permit eBay to impose those
costs on the content owner: permitting eBay to charge content owners, Tiffany & Co., for
example, a “reasonable fee” for complying with a statutory mandate to remove counterfeit
products.113
b. Targeting Payment Intermediaries.—To the extent that contraband and counterfeit
products tend to be sold from a stable site,114 the payment intermediary also can serve a useful
role—perhaps a broader role given the importance of payment to the offshore venues from which
contraband goods are shipped into the United States. As discussed above, roughly 90% of
modern internet retail transactions use a credit or debit card as a payment vehicle.115
Furthermore, although precise data is difficult to locate, it is plain that the lion’s share of those
transactions in this country make payment either through the Visa network or through the
MasterCard network, and that all of those transactions pass through a small handful of networks.
What that means, in turn, is that a remedy that prevented any of that small number of networks
111. This is not as vague as it sounds, because it is a term of art defined in Section 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1125.
112. This would differ from the existing DMCA in that the notice from the content owner would not identify specific
products to be removed, but rather specific marks to be examined.
113. This would more directly link the cost of eliminating the harms to the entity that benefits from its elimination.
Whether this should be done depends on one’s view of the baseline: is Tiffany & Co. entitled to a world free of trademark
dilution resulting from eBay’s business, or is eBay entitled to a world in which it can freely connect buyers and sellers? To
put it in economic terms, why can’t we view the risk to Tiffany as an externality created by eBay’s new business, which eBay
should be forced to internalize to ensure that its business in fact increases net social value. From that perspective, one likely
view is that it is appropriate to require the trademark owner to pay the reasonable costs of compliance to ensure that the private
value of the mark exceeds the transaction costs of the takedown. In a perfect world of course the baseline would be irrelevant
because the trademark owner would negotiate to purchase a takedown from eBay if that were an efficient outcome. Here,
there is some reason to think that might happen, where transaction costs between two large companies are low when compared
to the value of the rights being negotiated. Of course, it would be naïve to think that the selection of a particular baseline as a
legal rule would be irrelevant. As Bebchuk explains, the selection of a particular liability baseline is likely in many contexts
to have significant long-run effects on the allocation of investments related to the activity in question. See Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601 (2001). The
problem is quite similar to the problem of default rules in contracting, where the modern literature recognizes that the choice
of the default rule has important implications for the ultimate allocation of resources. Ronald J. Mann, Contracts—Only with
Consent, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1873, 1896–1901 (2004). This problem is much less relevant to the sections of our analysis (such
as child pornography and gambling), where the dispute over liability involve the government and a commercial party rather
than two commercial parties. In those situations, one can hardly imagine, for example, the government taking a payment from
eBay to allow eBay to continue facilitating transactions involving contraband.
114. We discuss below in the context of child pornography the difficulties of regulating material that appears at a site
without a stable domain name and IP address. That possibility raises a technological question of great importance to the
regime suggested here. Suppose, for example, that imposition of any of the regimes discussed here would lead sites that sell
contraband to shift to a model in which their IP addresses are highly unstable, and also suppose that it is not practical for
payment intermediaries to filter their transactions in a way that identifies the sites with unstable IP addresses. If that were so,
then it might be impractical for payment intermediaries to respond effectively to claims related to contraband. It is our
impression—admittedly a contingent impression subject to change as technology develops—that neither of those assumptions
are correct.
115. See Mann, supra note 48, at 681.
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from making payments to sites that sell contraband or counterfeit goods would make it relatively
difficult for those sites to survive.116 The biggest problem is the difficulty that the payment
intermediary might face in identifying the targeted transactions.
Collectively, those features tend to suggest that the payment intermediary is a relatively
ineffective target for responsibility for the counterfeit goods discussed above, where the auction
intermediary might be best placed to identify the illicit transactions. At the same time, in areas
where regulators can identify sites dominated by unlawful purchases—the salient examples here
are the sites selling untaxed cigarettes and unapproved pharmaceuticals—imposition of a hot-list
requirement on a payment intermediary might be most effective.

In practice, as we see,

regulators are becoming increasingly adept at securing voluntary agreements to such
requirements, apparently out of the desire of the payment intermediaries to forestall more
intrusive and formal regulation.117
2. Internet Gambling.—Internet gambling sites allow gamblers to play games or view lines
and place wagers on the outcome of everything from poker games and football to the presidential
election.118 Not surprisingly, traditional regulation of the primary malfeasors is difficult: Internet
gambling websites can be located anywhere in the world, outside the reach of U.S. laws that
attempt to regulate them. As with sites from which contraband and counterfeit products are sold,
the business model for gambling websites is central to designing an effective regulatory scheme.
Because the sites depend on being readily identifiable—pervasive advertising helps to give them
offline brand identity—the domain names and IP addresses that they use are relatively stable and

116. That certainly would be true if the remedy extended as well to PayPal. This assumes, as we believe, that at the
present time it would impose a substantial constraint on the revenues of an internet retail site for the site to be barred from
accepting payments from Visa, MasterCard, and PayPal, largely because existing payment alternatives remain unavailable to
most consumers. For a discussion of some of the problems with competing methods of payment, see MANN & WINN, supra
note 49, at 576–97.
117. One of the most interesting aspects of the problem is the dynamic through which state regulators secure voluntary
agreements, apparently operating in the shadow of potentially more onerous formal regulation. Without great detail, the
willingness of PayPal to cooperate with state regulators doubtless is attributable to its desire to avoid initiatives that would
bring its entire business under regulation as a money transmitter or the like. The willingness of more traditional credit card
providers to cooperate is not as easy to understand, given the strong arguments they could bring to bear that the activities of
state regulators cannot extend to the activities of national banks permitted by federal regulators. Our sense is that some
likelihood of federal support is likely to be important in most situations of effective state intervention. Notice, for example,
the participation of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms in the widely noted settlement regarding online tobacco
sales, see supra note 17. Similarly, as discussed in the section that follows, it is plain that federal policymakers have provided
consistent support to state regulatory initiatives aimed at offshore gambling. Our hypothesis is that here, as in the corporate
governance area, the resolution of disputes at the state level is directly influenced by the shadow of a potentially more
disruptive federal solution. Cf. Roe, supra note 25 (discussing the parallel corporate governance dynamic).
118. One website, Tradesports.com, located in Dublin, Ireland, famously offered lines on almost every political race of
2004 (and correctly predicted the winner of every state in the presidential race). See George Passantino, Putting Their Money
Where the Votes Are, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 14, 2004, at B-3.
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unlikely to be shared with other sites.119 It also is important that the business model of a
gambling site depends directly on making it easy for money to be transmitted to the site.120 Our
discussion starts with a summary of the existing regulatory scheme (the point of which is to
underscore its ineffectiveness) and follows with an analysis of how liability for intermediaries
could enhance the effectiveness of regulation.
Under American law, the states are the primary regulators of gambling.121 This has allowed
each state to take an approach to gambling that is more consistent with the mores of the particular
state.122 This approach allows states to eliminate a large portion of gambling that actually occurs
within the state (e.g., an illegal lottery being run from within the state). But states have difficulty
preventing activity that occurs outside of their borders, yet involves citizens acting within the
state’s borders (e.g., a lottery being legally run in one state that illegally solicits customers in
another state). In these types of cases, the federal government has stepped in to assist states in
enforcing state gambling regulations.123 But generally, the federal government has refrained from
exercising its Commerce Clause power to broadly regulate gambling even though the
Constitution plainly would permit such regulation in the context of the internet gambling.124
Turning to the specific rules for internet gambling, currently no state permits internet-based
gambling.125 In furtherance of that policy choice, the federal Wire Act (enacted in 1961) outlaws

119. For more on the frequency of shared IP addresses, see Ben Edelman, Web Sites Sharing IP Addresses: Prevalence
and Significance, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/ip-sharing/ (last updated Sept 12, 2003).
120. Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act, Hearing on H.R. 4419 Before House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Serv.,
107th Cong. (2000) (statement of Gregory A. Baer, Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions, Department of the Treasury);
GAO REPORT, supra note 46 at 53 (finding that over 85% of internet gambling websites accept Visa and MasterCard as forms
of payment).
121. See Thomas v. Bible, 694 F. Supp. 750, 760 (D. Nev. 1988), aff’d, 896 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990); State v. Rosenthal,
559 P.2d 830, 836 (Nev. 1977); Chun v. New York, 807 F. Supp. 288, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (all holding that authority over
gambling was reserved by the states through the Tenth Amendment).
122. For instance, the neighboring states of Nevada and Utah take opposite approaches to gambling presumably because
of the distinct cultural differences between the citizens of those states.
123. See, e.g., Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, 15 Stat. 194, 196 and Act of September 19, 1890, ch. 908, § 1, 26 Stat. 465,
codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1302 (2003) (making it illegal to send newspapers with lottery advertisements and other
lottery-related advertisements through the mail). See generally G. Robert Blakey & Harold A. Kurland, Development of the
Federal Law of Gambling, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 923, 931 (1978).
124. People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 185 Misc. 2d 852 (N.Y. Sup. 1999) (“[T]he Interstate Commerce Clause
gives Congress the plenary power to regulate illegal gambling conducted between a location in the United States and a foreign
location.”); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 46, at 12 (“Although gambling regulation is generally left to the states, the
federal government has the authority, under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, to regulate gambling activity that
affects interstate commerce. Internet gambling falls into this category, as bets are generally placed at a personal computer in
one state or country and received at a server in another state or country.”). It seems plain to us even after United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), that gambling transactions on the internet would involve interstate commerce even if the personal
computer of the gambler and the server were located in the same state, in part because of the likelihood that internet
transmissions between those locations would in some part cross state lines and in part because of the close relation between
those transactions and transactions that plainly do cross state lines.
125. See H.R. Rep. No. 108-133 (2003), stating:
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internet gambling,126 and thus has been the statute of choice used in the few federal prosecutions
of internet gambling.127 But it does so by targeting those directly responsible for the gambling,
not the intermediaries that merely facilitate it. Thus, under current law, intermediaries that do not
knowingly128 participate in the gambling activity have no responsibility for it.129
a. Targeting ISPs.—The first possibility is to use ISPs to limit internet gambling.130 As
discussed above, the internet gambling sites tend to be large, stable, and visible operations. And
while the Source ISPs can be located outside the reach of U.S. officials, Destination ISPs131 must
have a presence inside the jurisdiction in which their services are offered. Thus, it might seem,
Destination ISPs are particularly well suited to assist in limiting access of U.S. residents to
gambling websites located abroad. For example, if a Destination ISP is aware of particular
gambling sites, it should be able to prevent traffic from their customers from reaching those sites.
Requiring the ISPs to block such traffic would tend to be limited to activity that is illegal in the
jurisdiction of the customer’s ISP; this distinguishes gambling sites from sites like eBay, for

Virtually all States prohibit the operation of gambling businesses not expressly permitted by their respective
constitutions or special legislation. Internet gambling currently constitutes illegal gambling activity in all 50
States. Although in June of 2001 the Nevada legislature authorized the Nevada Gaming Commission to legalize
on-line, internet gambling operations if and when such operations can be conducted in compliance with Federal
law, the Gaming Commission believes that such compliance cannot be ensured at present.
126. The Wire Act states:
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for
the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets
or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication which entitles the
recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of
bets or wagers, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2003); see also Gottfried, supra note 30, at *74–*81 (discussing the application of the Wire Act to internet
gambling).
127. GAO REPORT, supra note 46, at 11 (“To date, the Wire Act is the federal statute that has been used to prosecute
federal internet gambling cases. . . .”).
128. The Wire Act applies only to those that “knowingly” use a wire communication facility to assist gambling. 18
U.S.C. § 1084.
129. For discussion of the similar problems other jurisdictions face, see Colin Scott, Regulatory Innovation and the Online
Consumer, 26 LAW & POL’Y 477, 481–82, 500 (2004).
130. See Jack Goldsmith, What Internet Gambling Legislation Teaches About Internet Regulation, 32 INT’L LAWY. 1115
(1998).
131. See supra subsection II(B)(2)(a).
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which the overwhelming majority of transactions are legal.132 Thus, regulations that burden the
site would have less collateral damage on innocent users of the site.133
At that point, the question becomes one of selecting an appropriate regulatory scheme. Our
intuition is to think that this is a case in which a less onerous hot-list scheme makes the most
sense. First, it is plausible to think that law enforcement authorities are better placed than ISPs to
identify illicit gambling sites. It is not clear that ISPs easily could identify the sites as illicit based
on the nature of the transmissions going to and from the sites, while law enforcement authorities
could identify them—at least the successful ones—through research with search engines,
observance of advertisements,134 and the like. Also, because the crime of gambling is in a sense
victimless, the object of law enforcement authorities is likely to be to limit the availability of the
sites going forward, rather than to ensure that a payment is extracted for each unlawful
transaction that has occurred in the past. Thus, a hot-list scheme is likely to serve the felt needs
of law enforcement while minimizing the costs to ISPs and thus the costs to innocent customers
of the ISPs.
There are, however, significant difficulties with this approach, starting with the difficulty of
coordinating multi-state regulation. Assume, for example, that Nevada wishes to permit certain
forms of internet gambling that Utah prohibits.135 If Utah required its ISPs to block transmissions
to and from the sites in question, it is quite likely that customers in Nevada would be adversely
affected. Indeed, this type of problem would be inevitable if the ISP’s customer base overlapped
the state line, absent some technological ability to differentiate the effectiveness of the filter
among its customers based on their physical location. Of course, enactment of a single federal
regulation would solve much of the problem, largely because of the greater likelihood that all

132. That analysis is open to the strategy that the interloper might open a wide-ranging “Games Bazaar” that involves
both legal and illegal activity, the effect of which would be to increase the collateral harm of regulation. Our strong
impression is that costs imposed by this kind of tactical design should not “count” as a reason against regulation. And in fact,
if the law establishes that such “Bazaars” will be subject to restrictive regulation, then from an ex ante perspective, it would be
quite bizarre for a rational businessperson to opt for a “Bazaar” structure. For a thorough discussion of using law to alter the
scope of bundled products, see Randal C. Picker, Unbundling Scope-of-Permission Goods: When Should We Invest in
Reducing Entry Barriers?, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
133. Such regulation may nevertheless be costly. On November 24, 2004, the World Trade Organization ruled that U.S.
law such as the Wire Act violated U.S. commitments to the WTO. World Trade Organization, United States—Measures
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004). This case was brought
by the Antiguan government in defense of its growing internet gambling industry. If the Wire Act is a violation of U.S. WTO
commitments, then laws specifically tailored to prevent internet gambling would certainly be found to violate those
commitments as well.
134. Our intuition that law-enforcement authorities easily could identify the sites if they wished to do so is based in part
on the frequency of radio advertising for illegal internet gambling sites on the leading sports radio station in the city in which
we live.
135. This example is given in Gottfried, supra note 30, at *76.
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customers of United States ISPs would reside in the United States.136 To be sure, there is some
reason to be wary of rapid federalization of internet gambling,137 as a subset of e-commerce,
largely because it denies regulators the opportunity to compare the effectiveness of competing
approaches.138
Another problem is the possibility that such a regulation would violate the First Amendment.
As we discuss in more detail in the section on child pornography below,139 one federal district
court recently held that blocking technology used to implement the Pennsylvania Internet Child
Pornography Act violated the First Amendment because the technology led to overblocking—that
is, it blocked sites that were not engaged in illegal conduct.140 As discussed above, gambling sites
are much more readily identifiable than pornography sites, and because of their large traffic, at
least the successful ones that are important targets are unlikely to share IP addresses.141 Thus, the
problem of overblocking is likely to be less serious in this context.142 It also is relevant that the
targeted activity (gambling rather than pornography) is entirely commercial, and thus not nearly
so likely to garner First Amendment protection as the pornographic speech discussed below. For
those reasons, there is some basis for thinking that the schemes we propose here would satisfy
constitutional scrutiny. Still, to the extent the constitutional question remains unclear—and we
do not discuss it definitively here—it should give regulators some hesitation in pursuing this
strategy.143
A final concern is that gambling websites would react to ISP blocking by designing their
user interfaces to utilize other technologies not susceptible of IP blocking. Our view is that any
such evolution would not place gambling activities outside the reach of ISPs, who would

136. The problem here is a standard one of regulatory symmetry: in practice ISP markets tend to be bounded by national
boundaries, which often makes it easier to impose regulations at the national level. See Mann, supra note 48, at 706.
137. The problem is complicated by the arguable hypocrisy of state gambling policy, which to an external observer
appears to be designed to provide monopoly power in the gambling market to native Americans and government entities rather
than to limit gambling based on the harms it causes consumers. The inconsistencies in American policy are part of the reason
efforts to target overseas gambling operators have been challenged as inconsistent with American obligations under the WTO.
World Trade Organization, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004). See also supra note 131.
138. Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, State Regulation of Electronic Commerce, 51 EMORY L.J. 1, 67–70 (2002)
(discussing inherent problems with federal regulation of electronic commerce such as public choice concerns, bureaucratic
inefficiencies, and the prevention of state regulation which may turn out to be a more effective method for regulating the new
industry).
139. See infra section IV(A)(3).
140. Center for Democracy & Technology v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 620 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
141. Contra Gottfried, supra note 30, at *75 (refraining from distinguishing internet gambling sites from other kinds of
websites, 87% of which share IP addresses).
142. Contra id.
143. Because of Congress’s consistent support of state regulation in this area, we do not discuss the possibility that state
regulatory initiatives in this area would violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
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nonetheless be required to carry the communication. Rather, blocking techniques may have to
adapt as the technologies adapt. For instance, if gambling websites distribute software that
connects gamblers directly to the gambling hall, instead of to a website as most business models
currently do, then blocking the TCP port utilized by the program is one potential response.144 The
point here is not to convince the reader that any imaginable technological adaptation by gambling
websites has a potential ISP blocking response. Rather, the point is that possible evolution by
gambling interests is not a justification for refusing to enlist ISPs in regulating internet gambling,
especially when foreseeable responses to gambling evolution exist.
To the skeptic that doubts Congress’s willingness to step into an area traditionally left to
state regulation, we note that Congress recently has considered such legislation: the proposed
Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 2000 would have required ISPs to terminate accounts for
those who run internet gambling sites as well as block access to foreign internet gambling
websites identified by law-enforcement authorities.145 Our analysis suggests that such statutes
well may be an appropriate response for policymakers that view gambling as imposing a serious
social harm.146
b. Targeting Payment Intermediaries.—The use of payment intermediaries to curtail
internet gambling has obvious advantages. As suggested above, the business model for gambling
sites depends on ready and convenient facilities for the transmission of funds to the sites. Given
the dependence of those businesses on traditional payment intermediaries, it appears that law
enforcement authorities could impose a considerable obstacle to the business of those sites
through a curtailment of activity from a small number of intermediaries. Moreover, because this
would not involve the potential for overblocking discussed above, it is difficult to see any
plausible First Amendment challenge. Finally, because a hot-list scheme barring transmissions to
internet gambling sites would resemble so closely existing hot-list schemes with which financial

144. This is a response to P2P problems suggested by Solum & Chung, supra note 36, at 929–30.
145. H.R. Rep. 106-655 (2000) (“Finally, the bill would impose new mandates on internet service providers (ISPs). H.R.
3125 would require internet service providers to terminate the accounts of customers who run gambling businesses or promote
illegal gambling and to block specific foreign gambling internet sites when given an official notice of noncompliance by state
or federal law enforcement agencies.”). For a sympathetic discussion of similar legislation, see Goldsmith, supra note 130.
146. The problem is complicated by the arguable hypocrisy of gambling policy, which to an external observer appears to
be designed to provide monopoly power in the gambling market to native Americans and government entities rather than to
limit gambling based on the harms it causes consumers. The inconsistencies in American policy are part of the reason efforts
to target overseas gambling operators have been challenged as inconsistent with American obligations under the WTO. World
Trade Organization, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004). See also supra note 131.
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intermediaries already must comply,147 it seems unlikely that such a scheme would impose costs
on them sufficiently substantial to raise the prospect of worrisome collateral effects on lawabiding customers.
Our sanguine view of the use of payment intermediaries is influenced by the extent to which
informal efforts directed at payment intermediaries have been successful even without formal
legal support.148 First, many card issuers voluntarily have limited the use of their credit cards for
gambling transactions. In the case of Providian, this seems to have been in response to lawsuits
by individuals who refused to pay debts incurred at internet gambling sites based on the
(dubious)149 claim that the activity was illegal and so facilitated by the card issuer as to make the
debt unenforceable.150 Other issuers seem to have acted out of broader concerns, including
concerns about the credit risk involved in gambling transactions.151 But whatever the reason,
those actions apparently have negatively affected the growth of internet gambling enterprises.152
More famously, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer has been conspicuously
successful in convincing payment intermediaries that it is in their best interests not to facilitate
internet gambling.153 Spitzer gained enormous leverage after winning a case in New York that
held New York law applicable to internet gambling regardless of the location of the servers or the

147. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
REGULATIONS FOR THE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY (2004) (describing the regulations in place requiring financial institutions to
block transactions to individuals and countries), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/regulations/
t11facbk.pdf.
148. See Gottfried, supra note 30, at *86; Scott, supra note 129, at 490.
149. See infra note 155.
150. See Providian National Bank v. Haines, Case No. V980858 (Superior Court, Marin County, California) (Crosscomplaint filed July 23, 1998) (making such a claim); Courtney Macavinta, Providian May Bar Customers from Net
Gambling, at http://news.com.com/2100-1040-231845.html?legacy=cnet (Oct. 22, 1999) (explaining the response by
Providian to the Haines case). See also Gottfried, supra note 30, at *82–*85.
151. GAO REPORT, supra note 46, at 4:
Full-service credit card companies that issue their own cards and license merchants to accept cards have
implemented policies prohibiting customers from using their cards to pay for internet gambling transactions and
will not license internet gambling sites. Credit card associations have instituted a different approach—a
transaction coding system that enables association members, at their discretion, to deny authorization of properly
coded internet gambling transactions. Many major U.S. issuing banks that are members of these associations
have chosen to block such transactions because of concerns over internet gambling’s unclear legal status and the
high level of credit risk associated with the industry.
152. Charlies Crawford & Melody Wigdahl, Internet Payment Solutions, in INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT 88–89 (7th ed.
2002) (estimating that internet gambling sites that relied on U.S. gamblers saw their revenues decrease by 35%–40% in 2000,
likely as a result of credit card companies’ efforts to stop use of their cards for internet gambling purposes). See GAO
REPORT, supra note 46, at 4 (“the credit card industry’s efforts to restrict the use of credit cards for internet gambling could,
according to research conducted by gaming analysts, reduce the projected growth of the internet gaming industry in 2003 from
43 to 20 percent, reducing industrywide revenues from a projected $5.0 billion to approximately $4.2 billion.”).
153. Less famously, the Florida Attorney General followed a similar strategy that was successful in convincing Western
Union to refrain from facilitating transactions with internet gambling operations. Gottfried, supra note 30, at *86.
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registration of the company.154 Armed with that decision as well as a federal circuit court
decision holding that federal law made internet gambling illegal,155 Spitzer began negotiating
with payment intermediaries to encourage them to limit their involvement with internet gambling.
Presumably, Spitzer was able to at least implicitly threaten litigation against these payment
intermediaries as accomplices in the commission of the illegal gambling activity.156 But however
the pressure was exerted, it was successful. The largest commitment came when Citibank agreed
that it would not approve transactions on its credit cards that involve internet gambling
websites.157 A couple of months later, Spitzer entered into an agreement with PayPal that
required the company to deny any transactions that it knew involved an internet gambling
website.158 More recently, Spitzer has extended those agreements with commitments from ten
additional banks to similarly end approvals for card transactions that involve internet gambling.159
Again, as with activity of ISPs, Congress has considered (but not yet enacted) legislation
targeting payment intermediaries.
160

Prohibition Act

Specifically, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding

would have forbidden payment systems from honoring payments for gambling

related services.161 In our view, the very possibility of such a statute casts a shadow over the
negotiations among state regulators and payment intermediaries, making it difficult for the
intermediaries to withstand plausible requests for cooperation.162
***

154. People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 185 Misc. 2d 852, 858 (N.Y. Sup. 1999) (finding the corporation’s
personal contacts with New York sufficient to exert personal jurisdiction and apply New York state law to it).
155. United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001).
156. Contra e.g., Cie v. Comdata Network, 275 Ill. App. 3d 759 (Ill. App. 1995), appeal den. 662 N.E.2d 423 (Ill. 1996);
In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468 (E.D. La. 2001); Jubelirer v. MasterCard Int’l Inc., 68 F.Supp.2d 1049
(W.D.Wis. 1999); Reuter v. MasterCard Int’l (4th Cir. Ill. 2001) (all holding that a cardmember’s use of credit to fund
gambling (in these cases at brick-and-mortar establishments) activities does not mean that the credit card company is involved
in gambling or the promotion of gambling). It is important, however, that in the internet context, the activity is both illegal
and easily identified as illegal.
157. In the Matter of Citibank South Dakota, N.A., at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/internet/litigation/citibank.pdf (June 21,
2002).
158. In the Matter of PayPal, Inc., at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/internet/litigation/paypal.pdf (Aug. 16, 2002).
159. Ten Banks End Online Gambling with Credit Cards, at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/feb/feb11b_03.html
(Feb 11, 2003).
160. See S. Rep. No. 108-173 (2003); H.R. Rep. No. 108-145 (2003); H.R. Rep. No. 108-133 (2003); H.R. Rep. No. 10851(I) (2003); H.R. Rep. No. 107-339(I) (2001); H.R. Rep. No. 106-771(I) (2000) (all considering the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Funding Prohibition Act, which targeted payment intermediaries).
161. See S. Rep. No. 108-173 (2003) (“The bill also would require financial institutions to take steps to identify and block
gambling-related transactions that are transmitted through their payment systems.”). See also Gottfried, supra note 30, at
*87–*90.
162. Our analysis is limited to the United States. Arthur Cockfield suggests to us that there is at least the possibility that
data protection rules like the EU’s Data Protection Directive might hinder the lawful cooperation of intermediaries in some
countries.
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In sum, it is not implausible to target ISPs to limit internet gambling, but regulation of
payment intermediaries is likely to be more effective, less likely to involve collateral effects on
lawful transactions, and less likely to face complicating legal challenges.
3. Child Pornography.—Although the First Amendment has limited the ability of the
American legal system to condemn pornography broadly, child pornography has long been
condemned and made illegal both in the United States163 and around the world.164 Specifically,
the Sexual Exploitation of Children Act of 1978165 makes it illegal to produce or distribute
obscene images of children (originally limited to those under sixteen, but later raised to
eighteen166).
During the 1970s and 1980s, child pornography laws apparently were relatively effective, at
least in this country, largely because the distribution of pornography required printed material,
which was difficult to find and expensive when found.167 But with the advent of the internet, the
distribution of child pornography has become cheaper and less risky.168

Producers can be

anywhere in the world, beyond the reach of law enforcement. The result has been a proliferation
of child pornography over the internet.169
This proliferation began on websites, but more recently has shifted primarily to peer-to-peer
(P2P) networks, following the same pattern as music piracy.170 We emphasize the shift to P2P

163. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (stating that content which depicts children engaged in sexual conduct is
“a category of material outside the protection of the First Amendment”).
164. See United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, preamble, 28 I.L.M. 1448, 4163, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25
(Nov. 20, 1989) (“States Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. For
these purposes, States Parties shall in particular take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent: . . .
(c) The exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials.”); PHILIP JENKINS, BEYOND TOLERANCE:
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET 30 (2001) (describing efforts to crack down on the sexual exploitation of children in
London in the 1880s and Los Angeles in the 1930s).
165. 18 U.S.C. §2252A (making it illegal to use mail to distribute child pornography or produce child pornography for
distribution through the mail).
166. See Pub. L. No. 98-292, §§ 5, May 21, 1984, 98 Stat. 205.
167. See Katherine S. Williams, Child Pornography and Regulation on the Internet in the United Kingdom: The Impact
on Fundamental Rights and International Relations, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 463, 469 (2003) (“Prior to the internet, this backseat
for child pornography was possibly justified; in the 1970s and 1980s magazines dealing in the area were difficult to obtain,
involving penetrating a complex black-market and were generally expensive. The official clampdown had reduced the trade
considerably.”); File-Sharing Programs: Child Pornography is Readily Accessible over Peer-to-Peer Networks, Testimony
Before the Comm. on Gov. Reform, House of Reps. (Statement of Linda D. Koontz, Mar. 13, 2003) [hereinafter Koontz
Testimony], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03537t.pdf (“Historically, pornography, including child
pornography, tended to be found mainly in photographs, magazines, and videos. The arrival and the rapid expansion of the
internet and its technologies, the increased availability of broadband internet services, advances in digital imaging
technologies, and the availability of powerful digital graphic programs have brought about major changes in both the volume
and the nature of available child pornography.”).
168. Id.
169. In 2002, there were 26,759 reports of child pornography on websites and 757 incidents of child pornography on Peerto-Peer networks (a fourfold increase from the previous year). Koontz Testimony, supra note 167, at 1.
170. Id.
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networks, because it reveals a division of business models that distinguishes this policy problem
from the ones discussed above: activity on peer-to-peer networks is much more difficult to
regulate through intermediaries, because it is more difficult for an ISP to identify and because it
often will not require the use of any payment intermediary (because there may be no payment
required). To the extent that a substantial shift to P2P networks occurs, it undermines the
effectiveness of any gatekeeper remedy and thus decreases the relative desirability of such a
remedy.
a. Targeting ISPs.—Again, we start with the possibility of targeting ISPs. Here, surely
because of the perception that any level of child pornography is a sufficiently serious policy
problem to justify substantial regulatory regimes, lawmakers have already moved to enlist the aid
of intermediaries in limiting the spread of child pornography. The most prominent legislation is
Pennsylvania’s Internet Child Pornography Act of 2002. That law adopted a hot-list regime,
under which ISPs are liable for allowing child pornography to be accessed through their services
after being notified of the availability of the pornography at a particular site:
An internet service provider shall remove or disable access to child pornography items
residing on or accessible through its service in a manner accessible to persons located
within this Commonwealth within five business days of when the internet service provider
is notified by the Attorney General pursuant to section 7628 (relating to notification
procedure) that child pornography items reside on or are accessible through its service.171

Penalties for failing to comply with the requirement escalated from a third degree
misdemeanor fine of $5,000 for the first offense to a third degree felony fine of $30,000 for the
third or subsequent occurrence. These penalties could be quite high if ISPs were unable or
unwilling to block access to these sites. But the hot-list system, as opposed to a traditional
damages regime, ensured that the ISPs would at least have the opportunity to avoid the fine by
blocking access to a particular URL.
In practice, however, it was not nearly so easy for providers to block access as the legislature
apparently supposed. The Pennsylvania Attorney General enforced the law against what we
would call Destination ISPs.172 When the ISPs received notice that child pornography could be
accessed over their networks, the ISPs typically attempted to comply by filtering their traffic

171. 18 Pa. S.C.A. § 7622 (2004).
172. See Center for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 620 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (explaining that the AG
subscribed to internet service from AOL, Verizon, WorldCom, Microsoft Network, Earthlink, and Comcast and surfed the
web through these services, sending notices to the ISPs as Child Pornography was accessed).
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either for IP addresses, DNS entries, or URLs.173 In theory at least, any of those approaches
might be successful in censoring the targeted content, but each network operates slightly
differently and could implement some of the technologies more efficiently than others.174 In
practice, most ISPs used IP filtering because it was the simplest for them to implement.175 The
problem with IP filtering, however, is that a website can keep the same URL and change IP
addresses. Because the URL is the information customers remember to find the site, monitoring
is wholly ineffective if it permits the site to avoid regulation simply by changing the IP address
but not the URL.176
addresses.

177

ISPs could respond by routinely checking URLs and updating IP

At the time of that litigation, however, it appeared to be the case that the most cost-

effective method of monitoring also was easy to evade.
Another problem is that IP blocking often leads to blocking content that was not targeted,
largely because of “virtual hosting,” where one IP address hosts several subfolders to which
different URLs are directed.178 Because of the perception that this so-called “overblocking”
resulted in the blocking of protected speech, a district court in 2004 held the statute
unconstitutionally overbroad.179

The court acknowledged that the law did not prescribe a

particular method of blocking prohibited content, but noted that the methods reasonably available
to the ISPs resulted in blocking a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech.180
Additionally, it is clear that the court was influenced by its perception that authorities were
implementing the statute with little concern for the potential for unjustified blocking, both
through incorrect blocking of sites in the first instance and through failure to remove blocks from
sites even after prohibited material had been removed.181 Ultimately, the court concluded that
these problems left the law beyond the bounds of regulation permitted by the First Amendment.182
Moreover, the court even went so far as to hold that the statute violated the dormant commerce
173. Id. at 628.
174. Id. at 629.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 632.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 617–18, 633.
179. Id. at 658 (“The operation and effect of this Act is that speech will be suppressed when a court order is issued, and
the procedural protections provided by the Act before the order can issue are insufficient to avoid constitutional infirmity.”).
The decision follows a line of similar cases invalidating statutes that require ISPs not to provide harmful materials to minors
over the internet. E.g., PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2004); ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir.
1999); AML v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
180. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d. at 637–42, 650–51.
181. Id. at 642–43. Zittrain, supra note 45, provides a thorough discussion of the technological questions, detailing a
number of steps that ISPs or regulators could take to limit the costs of such regulation.
182. Id. at 658.
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clause.183 The court generally reasoned that the local benefits of the statute were so trivial
(because the statute could be so easily evaded) that the commerce clause would not tolerate the
inevitable burden on other jurisdictions when the blocking affected out-of-state actors.184
Pappert imposes an unfortunate roadblock on the use of intermediary liability in this area.
To be sure, the dormant commerce clause problem is probably not a serious one, both because the
decision on that ground seems implausible185 and because congressional legislation explicitly
banning child pornography from the internet (or authorizing states to do so) should not be
difficult to obtain. The harder problem is how to deal with the First Amendment problem (which
is of course not within Congress’s control). It well may be that a regulator that diligently tried to
prevent the blocking of valid speech would obtain a better result. Still, at least for the time being
it might be that a law that was so well targeted as to satisfy the Pappert court would force ISPs to
invest significant funds in redesigning their networks to use URL blocking rather than IP
blocking.186 The law also apparently would have to provide for notice to blocked URLs and a
mechanism for removing a block from URLs when prohibited speech has been removed. All in
all, the costs to ISPs of compliance with such a law are likely to be sufficiently substantial to
undermine the net benefits of such a regime, even in the minds of policymakers that view child
pornography as a highly serious social problem. Again, advances in blocking technology could
change that balance in short order. For now, however, the problems with targeting ISPs seem
substantial.
b. Targeting Payment Intermediaries.—A second option for curtailing child
pornography over the internet is to target the payment intermediaries that make it profitable for
child pornography to be sold over the internet. As discussed above, a significant amount of
pornography is distributed through noncommercial transactions.187 But commercial websites are
a major source of child pornography on the internet, providing much of the material that is
distributed through noncommercial transactions.188

Thus, although targeting payment

intermediaries would not stop noncommercial distribution of child pornography, it could
183. Id. at 661–63.
184. Id.
185. For a thorough discussion of the relevant Commerce Clause concerns, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The
Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785 (2001)..
186. Id. at 652.
187. Koontz Testimony, supra note 167, at 5 (listing Usenet groups and peer-to-peer networks as principal channels of
distribution of child pornography).
188. Id. We speculate that the noncommercial distribution of material that is introduced to the internet in proprietary
transactions is caused at least in part by the difficulty that the operators of commercial child pornography sites would face in
enforcing rights they might have under copyright law to prevent copying of the material.
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significantly limit the commercial source of much of the pornography and thus have a substantial
effect on the level of wrongful conduct.189

Indeed, the effectiveness of targeting payment

intermediaries might be even greater for child pornography sites than it is for gambling sites.
This is true because commercial pornography websites generally require credit card information
to be on file before any customer can access the service. The point is that the credit card both
ensures payment for the service and verifies the customer’s age, to prevent problems that the site
would face if it too easily permitted minors to access pornographic material.190 Thus, there is
every reason to think that access to credit card processing is essential to the business of
commercial pornography websites.191
Following a hot-list strategy similar to the proposed Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding
Prohibition Act, states could pass laws that make it illegal to process credit card transactions from
websites that offer child pornography. These laws could instruct Attorneys General to monitor
websites and update lists of those websites for which credit card transactions should not be
processed.
Although such a law almost certainly would be challenged on dormant commerce clause
grounds,192 any successful litigation probably would result in nothing more than a shift of
legislative authority to the federal level: child pornography has so little public support that it is
easy to predict that federal legislators would be happy to pass and implement (and take credit for)
any statute that would provide an effective remedy for child pornography. Thus, it seems to us,
state regulators might be able to obtain cooperation from payment intermediaries even without
formal federal intervention.
There is some possibility, which is difficult to assess, that commercial websites could avoid
regulation by routing their credit card transactions through secondary companies that handle
transactions from many sites. The success of any such scheme hinges on the ability of the
merchant to outsmart the efforts of intermediaries to suppress such transactions. Our intuition is

189. We recognize the possibility that a strategy targeted at limiting commercial exploitation of child pornography could
lead to an increase in noncommercial P2P-based child pornography. It is plausible, however, that regulators would view the
eradication (or mitigation) of commercial exploitation as an important policy achievement whatever the effect might be on
P2P exploitation.
190. Pornography websites were channeled into the use of credit cards to verify age in part by the affirmative defense
offered by § 231 of the Communications Decency Act. 47 U.S.C. §231(c)(1)(A) (“It is an affirmative defense to prosecution
under this section that the defendant, in good faith, has restricted access by minors to material that is harmful to minors by
requiring use of a credit card, debit account . . . .”).
191. See Koontz Testimony, supra note 166, at 5–6 (mentioning a child pornography ring that included websites based in
Russia and Indonesia (content malfeasors located out of US reach) and a Texas-based firm that provided credit card billing
and access service for the sites).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 183–184 (describing the holding of the Pappert court on dormant commerce
clause grounds).
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that the intermediaries could defeat those efforts with relatively little difficulty. First, it is a direct
violation of Visa and MasterCard rules for transactions to be submitted directly as the
transactions of another merchant. Second, with respect to secondary processors (which are
permitted to submit transactions for other merchants), Visa and MasterCard already engage in
close monitoring, which makes it easy to identify transactions from particular illegal sites.193
There remains the possibility of more sophisticated efforts at evading scrutiny. For example, sites
might try to change their IP addresses and URLs so frequently as to make it difficult for lawenforcement authorities to maintain accurate hot lists.194 We believe, however, that the existing
tools for monitoring the patterns of merchant transactions (including the patterns of
chargebacks—likely to be high at sites that provide adult content) would make any sincere195
effort at implementation reasonably effective.
It also is relevant that the collateral costs of such an approach would be relatively low. As
discussed above, banks are already required to monitor lists and ensure that payments are not
made to prohibited entities such as terrorists.196 Similar procedures for these prohibited payment
recipients could be easily plugged into existing structures with little additional costs imposed.
Nor is there a great likelihood of chilling valuable social conduct that is adjacent to or easily
confused with the targeted conduct: it might be that some adult content that is technically not
obscene would be chilled, but regulators are likely to regard the social loss from that chilling as a
cost that they are willing to bear.

* * *
In the end, targeting payment intermediaries is unlikely to prevent completely the
dissemination of child pornography over the internet, but it could strike at the heart of the
commercial industry that profits from it. If a hot-list scheme like the one summarized above in
fact would impose a substantial financial barrier for those firms, it seems likely that the regulation
could be implemented without substantial collateral harms to law-abiding customers of the

193. We know this from the pleadings in the Perfect 10 litigation.
194. Although we have engaged in no field research to examine the question, our anecdotal impression from news sources
is that the pornography industry seems to differ in this respect from the gambling industry, because gambling sites depend
largely on advertising to draw customers, which requires stable domain names, while pornography sites depend largely on
access from search engines and links from other sites, which seem to be updated and changed frequently to avoid lawenforcement monitoring.
195. As the staunch resistance in the Perfect 10 litigation suggests, sincerity of implementation cannot be assumed too
readily, given the great profits that the payment intermediaries presently derive from sites that provide adult content.
196. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
REGULATIONS FOR THE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY (2004) (describing the regulations in place requiring financial institutions to
block transactions to individuals and countries), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/regulations/
t11facbk.pdf.
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intermediaries. It is of course a question for responsible policymakers whether the costs of such a
regime can be justified by the potential benefits of imposing those imperfect barriers on the
commercial sector of the child pornography industry. Perhaps the most that can be said is that the
reforms outlined here should be attractive to policymakers that view commercial child
pornography as an important and serious problem.
4. Internet Piracy.—One of the main driving forces behind this Essay is the generally
myopic focus of the existing literature on copyright piracy as the most salient example of
wrongful internet conduct.

Accordingly, because so much already has been written about

regulatory schemes that respond to that problem,197 we address the subject only briefly here,
focusing on the key points of the analytical framework we set out above in Part III.198
From that perspective, continuing the progression from the sections above, the most salient
feature of internet piracy is the extent to which it has come to be dominated by disaggregated P2P
filesharing. The technology of copyright infringement on the internet has evolved rapidly in the
last decade. The basic point is that it would be easy to prevent the posting of copyright-infringing
material on static websites through vicarious copyright infringement, but peer-to-peer networks
shielded networks from copyright infringement claims through the potential protection afforded
by Sony.199

Despite that potential shield, Napster was found guilty of vicarious copyright

infringement based on the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the network had the right and ability to
supervise the infringing activity.200
Responding to that analysis, modern peer-to-peer networks have eliminated even this
element of their culpability by separating networks from software and decentralizing the indexing
process.201 They have thus shielded themselves from the type of vicarious liability found in
Napster.202

Moreover, following the lead suggested by Kraakman’s analysis of asset

insufficiency,203 networks and ISPs involved in the industry have evolved to become judgment

197. Fashioning a regulatory scheme for copyright piracy also must account for the direct effects of the internet on the
nature of the conduct. The main effect of the internet on gambling and pornography has been to facilitate dissemination of
activity that remains socially unacceptable. With respect to copyrighted materials, however, the rise of the internet has altered
considerably the uses to which copyrighted materials are put, in ways that call into question the continuing propriety of the
existing framework and thus complicate vigorous enforcement of that framework.
198. For a recent discussion that focuses directly on the propriety of intermediary liability, see Hamdani, supra note 29.
199. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
200. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
201. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.) (refusing to find liability for
Grokster even though it aided end-users in copyright infringement because the service was fundamentally different than
Napster), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
202. Id.
203. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 78, at 869.
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proof, limiting the effectiveness of sanctions even against the intermediaries. It seems natural to
expect as the technology develops that it in practice will be so decentralized as to obviate the
existence of any intermediary gatekeeper that could be used to shut down the networks.204
Indeed, efforts to use intermediaries to limit P2P filesharing have been so ineffective—
despite the industry’s victory in Napster—that the content industry has turned again to what
seems an almost desperate attempt to prosecute individual copyright infringers who make
copyrighted material available over peer-to-peer networks.205

At least initially, the content

industry was able to prosecute such claims because current peer-to-peer networks and software
allow them to capture enough information about individuals who connect to the network to find
the infringers and identify the extent of their infringement.206 Without this information, the
copyright protectors would not have enough information to file a claim. However, new networks
and users have taken steps to avoid liability by simply shielding their identities and libraries so
that copyright protectors are unable to gather the information necessary to prosecute their
claims.207 And as this evolution of copyright infringement continues, it seems most unlikely that
prosecuting individual users will result in an end to the harm.208
In the terms of this Essay, the most plausible intermediary strategy209 is regulation of the
ISPs that provides service to the individual user.

If these ISPs have notice of copyright

infringement by subscribers, which copyright protectors are happy to give, they could be required

204. See generally Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679 (2003) (explaining that peer to peer networks have
eliminated the intermediary on which copyright enforcement relies). The most interesting part of Wu’s work is the general
theme that the cultural source of the great resistance to copyright law has been the tactical error to press claims of enforcement
too harshly. This resonates with the backlash phenomenon described by Mark Roe in Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217
(1998) and extended in POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2003).
205. See Amy Harmon, Subpoenas Sent to File Sharers Prompt Anger and Remorse, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2003, at C1.
The success of these efforts is debatable. See Brian Hindo & Ira Sager, Music Pirates: Still on Board, BUS. WK., Jan. 26,
2004, at 13. In part this is because the adverse publicity those efforts have generated have suggested to most observers that
Congress would lack the political will to adopt a vigorous enforcement system that would result in strong or sure punishment
for individual filesharers. For an interesting Note on the dangerous, and perhaps unconstitutional, effect of aggregating
statutory damages in infringement cases such as these, see J. Cam Barker, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against
Illegal File-Sharing: The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright Infringement, 83
TEXAS L. REV. 525 (2004).
206. See Alice Kao, Note, RIAA v. Verizon: Applying the Subpoena Provision of the DMCA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
405, 408.
207. Scott Banerjee, P2P Users Get More Elusive, BILLBOARD, July 31, 2004, at 5.
208. Perversely, what probably has in fact reduced the frequency of copyright infringement is more crime: using P2P
systems subjects a computer to the threat of viruses that are spread inside the files obtained. Wendy M. Grossman, Speed
Traps, INQUIRER (U.K.), Jan. 14, 2005, at ___ , available at http://www.theinquirer.net/?article=20718 (last visited Jan. 15,
2005). Another dissuasion has been the systematic effort by the recording industry to saturate P2P systems with dummy files
that make getting the music a user actually wants quite difficult. See Malaika Costello-Dougherty, Tech Wars: P-to-P
Friends, Foes Struggle, PC WORLD, Mar. 13, 2003, at __ , available at http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/
0,aid,109816,00.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2005) (documenting the practice and attributing it to a company called Overpeer,
which is apparently an industry anti-piracy company).
209. There are of course other strategies. E.g., supra note 54.
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to terminate the service of the customer. Because such a scheme does not require monitoring by
the ISPs—but relies wholly on monitoring by content providers—it could be implemented with
less cost than schemes that would require the ISP to monitor the conduct of its customers to
identify unlawful filesharing—which strikes us as quite difficult under existing technology, and
perhaps normatively undesirable in any case.
Interestingly enough, the Copyright Act already comes close to including such a regime in
Section 512(i)(1)(A), which withholds the DMCA liability shield from any ISP that does not have
a policy of terminating access for customers who are “repeat infringers.” It is not clear to us why
content providers have not relied more heavily on that regime in their efforts to target frequent
P2P filesharers. Our guess is that the provision is rendered ineffective by the ease with which any
individual terminated under that section could obtain internet access with a new provider.210
B. Breaches of Security
We close with a brief discussion of a set of internet problems that collectively can be
characterized as security harms: viruses, spam, phishing, and hacking. Generally, these are harms
that are unique to the internet, because they involve conduct that is motivated by the rise of the
heavily interconnected networks of which the internet consists. The harm of these actions is
measured by the immense amounts of money spent by end-users to purchase software to avoid
these problems, by the time spent repairing damaged computers, and by the lost value of
computers slowed or rendered inoperable by these incidents.211

Because of the rapid

technological development in this area, the comparatively nascent regimes for defining the
responsibility even of primary malfeasors, and in part because of our relative lack of knowledge
in the area, we are much less confident in our ability to discern the relevant policy concerns in
these areas than for the content harms we discuss above. We discuss the topic generally only to
illustrate two obvious points that our framework suggests for these issues.
1. Lack of Strong Intermediaries.—In comparison to the conduct disseminating illegal
content that was the subject of the preceding sections, this is not an area where there is nearly so
210. We note that the provision is quite vaguely written and thus would be likely to result in substantial litigation if it ever
came into frequent use. Among the most obvious problems is the fact that it offers no guidance as to the meaning of the term
“repeat” infringer or as to who is to determine if particular customers “are” in fact repeat infringers. For a discussion of that
problem, see Lemley & Reese, supra note 54, at 1420-21.
211. One estimate put the total cost of viruses at $55 billion for 2003. Compressed Data, supra note 14. There is
significant evidence to suggest that these problems are increasing. A recent study, for example, put the total number of
Phishing scams in December 2004 at 9,019, an 8,000% increase over the 107 such scams in December of 2003. Brian Krebs,
Tech Heavyweights Agree to Share ‘Phishing’ Data, WASHINGTON POST.COM, Feb. 14, 2005, at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A24065-2005Feb14.html. See also Internet ‘Phishing’ Scams Soared in
April, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2005, at B5.
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obvious a need for legislative intervention to sanction intermediaries. As the examples above
illustrate, the paradigmatic case for the deployment of a strategy of intermediary liability is the
case in which primary malfeasors cannot be controlled directly and in which readily identifiable
intermediaries exist that readily can control the conduct yet choose not to do so.
The context of security harms differs in two obvious respects from that paradigm. First, it is
not at all clear that any intermediary readily can control the conduct in question. Perhaps the
actors who are best able to increase internet security are the software manufacturers that develop
the applications that make the internet useful. Although it is not impossible to view the software
designer as yet another intermediary that could solve harms from viruses, spam, and hacking, we
think it is less useful to think of that as intermediary liability than as a rapidly developing species
of products liability.212
Looking solely at the intermediaries we identify in section II(B)(2) of this Essay, payment
and auction intermediaries are entirely irrelevant in the context of internet security, because of the
lack of any payment or sale transaction in the typical security breach. And it seems unlikely that
ISPs serving those that introduce viruses and spam into the internet community can control the
misconduct, if only because of the difficulty of identifying the transmissions that cause the
problem and filtering out the malicious code.213 Similarly, it is not at all clear that ISPs serving
the customers victimized by security breaches can solve the problem, again because of the
difficulty they face in designing reliable systems for identifying the kind of traffic that creates
these harms. Finally, while phishing scams require the use of ISPs to host spoofed content, those
ISPs are Source ISPs that can be located anywhere in the world. Whether such spoofed websites
are in fact hosted on computers located outside U.S. jurisdictions is an empirical question to
which we don’t know the answer. But even if it turns out that those ISPs are located within the
U.S., targeting them will simply force them to move their operations abroad.214 That is not to say
that it is impossible to devise effective intermediary-based strategies. It is to say, however, that it

212. Doug Barnes has written a fine note outlining the perverse market incentives that have led to a market failure for
secure software. Douglas A. Barnes, Deworming the Internet, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 279 (2004).
213. This is not to say that ISPs should not be required to assist law enforcement officials to the extent possible to track
those who release malicious code onto the internet. See LICHTMAN & POSNER, supra note 28 (arguing for liability that forces
such cooperation). But our relatively uninformed view is that it is technologically difficult or impossible for ISPs to filter
traffic to prevent the code from being released on the internet in the first place. In contrast, the responses we suggest to
combat the harms discussed in the previous sections of this Part involve intermediaries that have the ability to prevent harm in
the first instance. For a discussion of the rapidly evolving technological possibilities here, see Zittrain, supra note 26.
214. Websites that host some content would likely be liable under a theory of vicarious liability for fraud. Thus, state
laws, and perhaps the Wire Act, already target the primary malfeasors of the harm. But this obviously has not solved the
problem.
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is likely to require a remedy that is categorically more disruptive of the physical and social
character of the internet than the remedies that we discuss above.215
2. Market Incentives Already Exist.—At the same time, market incentives appear to be
driving intermediaries limit these kinds of harms. This is clearest with respect to spam, where
one of the most prominent service features on which ISPs compete is their ability to protect
customers from spam.216 The basic point is that security harms generally have the effect of
directly harming the customers of those ISPs. Thus, customers generally will value features of
ISP service that limit spam. To give another example, phishing threatens the legitimacy of
internet commerce. If customers lose faith in the security of internet transactions, either because
they are not sure about the true identity of the websites they are visiting, or because they are not
confident in their own abilities to engage in e-commerce without inadvertently divulging sensitive
information, those customers are likely to stop using e-commerce websites. This threat has lead
to a concerted effort by industry to combat phishing schemes.217 Further, phishing scams have
provided motivation for new technologies and new firms to spring up to combat the danger.218
This of course is quite different from the contexts discussed above: the customer purchasing child
pornography or gambling online would not wish to pay a premium for an ISP service that made it
practically impossible for the customer to gain access to sites containing that content.
We do not wish to push this point too far. Doug Lichtman and Eric Posner, for example,
have argued with some force that the market forces we discuss here are suboptimal, so that the
efforts we identify remain insufficiently vigorous.219

To the extent those responses are

suboptimal, the case for intermediary liability is stronger, as they recognize.220 Our point here is
only that the markets give some positive motivation in this area, which differs from the gambling
and pornography areas, where intermediaries often profit from the misconduct. Those efforts to
date certainly have not put ISPs in a position to prevent that misconduct entirely, but they do
reflect at a minimum an effort to eradicate the conduct that differs substantially from the response
215. Zittrain, supra note 26, emphasizes the potential for highly intrusive—yet effective—actions in this area.
216. Compare, for example, Yahoo Mail’s touting of its spam filters at http://mail.yahoo.com/?.intl=us (“Powerful spam
protection: Read only the mail you really want”) with Earthlink’s spamBlocker software, provided free of charge to Earthlink
customers at http://www.earthlink.net/spamblocker/ (“Is your email inbox crammed with spam? We can help. Our
spamBlocker tool eliminates virtually 100% of junk email.”)
217. E.g. Krebs, supra note 211 (noting that Microsoft, eBay, and Visa recently signed agreements to work with a firm
that gathers information on phishing incidents).
218. See id.; Cloudmark Helps PayPal Deliver “No-Phishing” Solution to its Customers, TMCnet.com, Dec. 16, 2004, at
http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2004/Dec/1102325.htm (describing a plug-in available for Microsoft Outlook that helps
customers identify phishing emails).
219. See LICHTMAN & POSNER, supra note 28.
220. See id.
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the typical ISP takes to respond to the possibility that its customers might be purchasing child
pornography or gambling online. If it is true that market incentives are driving an appropriately
vigorous response, then an overlay of regulation would provide little added benefit, and might
even be counterproductive, given the complexities of defining effective remedies that are not
highly intrusive.
V.

Conclusion
The internet is coming of age. Though at the advent of the internet it may have been

necessary to develop laws and policies that protected the fertile ground in which the businesses
and technologies of the internet have grown, today the internet has taken hold and permeates our
daily lives. And non-internet companies have incorporated the internet into their business models
to increase efficiency and customer service. At the same time, however, harm perpetrated over
the internet continues to grow each year. The pirates have arrived on the high seas of the online
world and the lack of regulation makes their predations all too easy. The time has come for
lawmakers to implement sensible policies designed to reign in the pirates while minimizing the
impact on law-abiding users of the internet.
As the internet enters the final stage in its development—rules—we suggest that lawmakers
carefully reconsider the early policy of the Congress that internet intermediaries should not bear
any burden in bringing order to the internet. We believe that this policy ignores essential truths of
the online world—that anonymity and porous international borders make targeting primary
malfeasors difficult if not impossible. Internet intermediaries, on the other hand, are easy to
identify and have permanent commercial roots inside the jurisdictions that seek to regulate the
internet. Further, these internet intermediaries are essential to most of the transactions on which
the internet pirates rely. When intermediaries have the technology capability to prevent harmful
transactions and when the costs of doing so are reasonable in relation to the harm prevented, they
should be encouraged to do so—with the threat of formal legal sanction if that becomes
necessary.
The internet is indeed at a crossroads in its development. Whether pirates will continue to
threaten legitimate users of the internet, or whether the internet will fulfill its potential for helping
users live more fulfilling lives depends on the direction lawmakers take in facing the challenges
that currently befall the internet.

Existing businesses that derive large profits from the

misconduct—payment intermediaries with respect to child pornography, for example—may resist
reforms vigorously. Conversely, it may be that market forces or informal pressure applied from
state regulatory officials may solve many problems without the need for specific legislative
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intervention.
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Alternatively, continuing market pressures may force improved standards of

operation that will solve many of the problems that we address. We have no firm conviction
about the shape of the final outcome. We offer this Essay only in the hope that it can aid the
design of sensible internet regulation.

